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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three essays on the perdurantist approach to
persistence and identity over time. In Chapter 1, I discuss how the follow-
ing papers are to be understood as parts of a unified perdurantist account
of persistence over time.This chapter also outlines some ofmy philosoph-
ical assumptions and provides some background information about the
metaphysics of persistence.
In Chapter 2, I respond to the objection that the worm theory is unable
to account for our intuitions about ordinary counting sentences. I do this
by invoking the standard linguistic phenomenon of covert quantifier do-
main restriction and supplementing the worm theory with situation se-
mantics. My version of the worm theory makes our intuitive judgements
comeout true, and it does sowell enough that there is noneed to adopt the
stage theory or revisionary theories of counting. Furthermore,my version
of the worm theory offers a unified account of event- and object-related
counting.
Chapter 3 focuses on a commonly neglected difference between differ-
ent kinds of perdurantism, which are differences in mereological priority.
I discuss three different views: parts-first perdurantism, no-priority per-
durantism, and wholes-first perdurantism. I briefly outline all three views
and some of the motivations for each of them. I fend off objections from
and motivations for no-priority perdurantism. I also contend that intra-
perdurantist debates about phenomenology ought not to be framed with
respect to these forms of perdurantism. Instead, I suggest that the rela-
tivity of simultaneity presents an interesting scenario for parts-first and
wholes-first perdurantists.
I respond to Thomas Pashby’s arguments against the doctrine of tem-
poral parts in Chapter 3. Pashby argues that metaphysicians ought to
give an account of how quantum systems persist over time and that non-
relativistic quantummechanics is incompatible with perdurantism. I con-
tend that his arguments rely on controversial, non-standard assumptions
about the existence and importance of time observables. I demonstrate
that perdurantists have no problem giving an account of how quantum
systems persist over time in reference to an external time parameter.
Finally, I concludewith a summary ofmy arguments and some thoughts
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Theaimof this introduction is partly to contextualise the essays contained
in the body text and to suggest how they form a unified whole. I pro-
vide some useful background information about the metaphysics of per-
sistence. In particular, I provide a brief overview of the general debate
between perdurantists and endurantists, along with some topics which I
do not cover in the thesis proper. Then, I explain the format of this thesis
and briefly outline the three essays contained within.
1.1 background and assumptions
Perdurantists, also called four-dimensionalists, believe that objects persist
by having different temporal parts at different times (Sider, 2001a). This
notion of ‘temporal parts’ is sometimes thought to be deeply mysterious
or needlessly complicated (Van Inwagen, 2000). However, there is a fairly
simple way to understand what temporal parts are. Consider an ordi-
nary person, Danny. Danny extends through space. We might think that
Danny extends through space by having different spatial parts at each of
his subregions. Some spatial parts of me (my feet) are located on the floor,
whereas my head is not. We also have a neat way of explaining how I can
have seemingly contradictory properties. I can be both cold and hot at the
same time because part of me is cold and a different part of me is hot. Just
as one might say that I extend through space by having different spatial
parts, perdurantists believe that I extend through time by having differ-
ent temporal parts.1 The fusion of my temporal parts is called a spacetime
worm. Perdurantism is also called four-dimensionalism or the doctrine of
temporal parts (Sider, 2001a).2 I use these terms interchangeably.3
The alternative to perdurantism is endurantism. Endurantism, put sim-
ply, is any theory of persistence which denies perdurantism. This termi-
1 What ‘by having’ is supposed to be doing in the explanation is something that I explore
in Perdurantism and Priority.
2 Some people use the term four-dimensionalism to refer to the B-theory of time or the
conjunction of the B-theory and perdurantism. Instead, I treat four-dimensionalism,
pedurantism, and the doctrine of temporal parts synonymously.
3 Awkwardly, I favour the use of the term ‘four-dimensionalism’ in Counting for Worm
Theorists while generally using ‘perdurantism’ in the other chapters. This is because I
generally prefer using ‘perdurantism’, but I did not when I submitted the paper Counting
for Worm Theorists for review. So, I have left that chapter unchanged.
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nology and framing was originally introduced by Mark Johnston (1983)
and popularised by David Lewis (1986). Endurantism is a view where
things are ‘wholly’ present at each time they exist, rather thanbeing ‘partly’
present in virtue of having temporal parts located at the various times they
exist at. Endurantism is also called three-dimensionalism.
One of the main motivations behind metaphysical theories of persis-
tence is the problem of change, also known as the problem of temporary
intrinsics (Hawley, 2018: §3). Suppose I bought an unripe, green banana
from the supermarket.Three days later, I notice that the banana has ripen-
ed and turned yellow. According to the law of non-contradiction, a single
object cannot have incompatible properties. The banana, understood as a
persisting entity, is technically both unripe and ripe. Now, obviously, this
is no genuine contradiction because the banana is ripe and unripe at dif-
ferent times. But consider a slightly different case, where I leave the unripe
banana on the table and someone replaces it with a very similar looking
ripe banana. If I turned around straight afterwards, I would be able to fig-
ure out that the original banana has been replaced. In the original case, it
is a lapse of three days which does not induce a similar belief. But why?
Some endurantists prefer an answer which appeals to an A-theory of
time.TheA-theory is the view that times are ordered by pastness, present-
ness, and futurity. This ordering is objective and, in their view, cannot be
completely captured by tenseless propositions like ‘The Banana was un-
ripe on February 1, 2021.’ and ‘The Banana was ripe on February 3, 2021.’
Reality was different in the past and will be different in the future. Some
A-theorists, known as presentists, believe that only things in the present
exist. They have the resources to say that what is absolutely true is what
is true at some particular moment, and so deny that what obtains at any
other moment is true. If the ripe banana is present and the unripe banana
is not, then only the ripe banana exists and there is no problem of change.
The banana is ‘wholly present’ and none of its parts are absent.
The A-theoretic response is quite radical and not without controversy.
Most perdurantists and indeed many endurantists endorse the B-theory
instead. The B-theory of time is the view that the past, present, and future
are all equally real. Times are not ordered by past-present-future, they
are ordered in a tenseless way. What is in ‘the past’ is simply ‘earlier than’
and what is in ‘the future’ is simply ‘later than’. Eternalism is a popular B-
theoretic view of temporal metaphysics in which the ‘past’, ‘present’, and
‘future’ all exist equally.Most of the ideaswhich I engagewith in this thesis
assume or at least assume compatibility with a B-theory of time.
Perdurantists have a solution to the problem of change which is com-
patible with the B-theory. On the perdurantist view, the banana has many
temporal parts.The proper bearer of the properties ‘being unripe’ and ‘be-
ing green’ is an earlier temporal part, while the proper bearer of the prop-
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erties ‘being ripe’ and ‘being yellow’ is a later temporal part. The banana
changes over time in much the same sort of way that a road varies in its
height as you drive along it. A road can be in a mountainous region and
on flat fields because it has different spatial parts in those places. Similarly,
the banana persists through change and time because it has different tem-
poral parts at different times.
There is a semantic dispute between perdurantists about whether ordi-
nary objects are the fusions of their temporal parts or simply brief tem-
poral parts or stages. The former are known as worm theorists and the
latter stage theorists. Some people choose not to consider stage theorists
to be perdurantists and instead call them exdurantists (Haslanger, 2003).
I explore the debate between stage theorists and worm theorists in more
detail in Counting for Worm Theorists.
B-theoretic endurantists often deal with the problem of change by rela-
tivising properties to times. The banana is unripe on the first day and ripe
on the third because it bears something like a ‘being unripe-on’ relation
to the first day and a ‘being ripe-on’ relation to the third day. There is no
contradiction here, the banana simply bears different relations to differ-
ent things. A different endurantist approach is adverbialism. Adverbialists
relativise the ways things instantiate different properties. The banana has
the property ‘being unripe’ in a first day way and ‘being ripe’ in a third
day way.
In an eternalist framework, it is hard to make sense of endurantism as
a view where objects are ‘wholly present’ in the sense that all of its parts
simultaneously exist. There are many cases where objects change because
they lose or gain some parts. When a banana is plucked off of a banana
tree, then it has changed because it lost one of its proper parts. If change
by losing or gaining parts is possible, then many objects will fail to be
wholly present on this view.
Worries about how to develop a B-theoretic endurantism that doesn’t
render change by loss of parts impossible has led to what Damiano Costa
calls the locative turn. (Costa, 2017: 57) Locative endurantists hold that
objects have many exact locations at many spacetime regions. This is an
endurantist view because these regions are not temporal parts of objects.
For an object to be wholly present at a region is for it to be exactly located
at that region. Hence, locative endurantism provides the resources to say
that objects are wholly present at each region they exactly occupy without
rendering change by loss of parts impossible.
The standard alternative to this multi-location view is one where ob-
jects only have a single exact location. This view, often called locative per-
durantism, is the view that objects are exactly located at their path. The
path of an object is the region where its entire career is exactly located.
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The terms ‘locative endurantism’ and ‘locative perdurantism’ are mis-
leading. Hudson (2001) endorses a view where objects have multiple ex-
act locations and have temporal parts. Similarly, one can believe that ob-
jects have a unique exact location and no temporal parts. These views are
sometimes treated as hybrids of perdurantism and endurantism, but in
my taxonomy they are not. The former view is a perdurantist one at heart
and the latter is an endurantist one.
The view that objects are located at their path and have no temporal
parts has received many different names in the literature. Cody Gilmore
(2008) considers it a form of endurantism, as do I. Kristie Miller (2009)
calls it terdurantism. AlessandroGiordani andDamianoCosta (2013) call
it temporal bare uni-locationism. Pashby (2013; 2016) calls it temporal
holism. Costa (2020) calls it simplism. Paul R. Daniels; Sam Baron and
Kristie Miller (2019; 2019) call it transdurantism. While I consider this
view to be a form of endurantism, I call it transdurantism throughout the
thesis.
1.2 contextualis ing the thesi s
This thesis is a collection of essays on perdurantist theories of persistence
through time. This is not a traditional thesis, it is a thesis by ‘publication
format’. The thesis is not structured by a series of related chapters with
an overarching argument. Rather, it is a collection of three essays which
are largely independent from each other. The essays are such that they
can be read on their own, without needing to read them alongside the
introduction and conclusion or any of the other essays.
A minor downside of this is that the thesis involves some repetition.
Some of the same ideas, like perdurantism, are briefly reintroduced in
each chapter. The upside is that this format allows me to prosecute mul-
tiple self-contained arguments without the same kind of lengthy buildup
and literature review expected in a conventional thesis. I am able to ded-
icate more of the thesis to specific contemporary issues and debates.
This is not a thesis wholly dedicated to solving the problemof change or
providing a knockdown argument for perdurantism or against enduran-
tism.The debate between perdurantism and endurantism has gone on for
years.There aremany highly sophisticated forms of perdurantism and en-
durantism that can stand up to intense scrutiny. I think it’s unlikely that
we’ll make much progress by continuing to explore issues that have al-
ready been explored in great detail by many other philosophers. Much
of the recent literature on persistence concerns very specific issues and
debates over accounting for certain phenomena where small amounts of
terrain are won and lost. In a weaker, but more personal sense, I think it’s
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unlikely that I will be able to make much of a genuine contribution to the
debate in that way.
Instead, this thesis is composed of three different essays on a specific is-
sue related to themetaphysics of persistence.While the problemof change
has been thoroughly explored,many of the issueswhich I discuss have not.
My approach is more fruitful because there is a lot more room for me to
contribute to these specific debates than there is for me to contribute to
the overall debate in a comprehensive way, especially in a project with the
scope of a Master’s thesis.
Each essay intersects with different related areas and topics in philos-
ophy. The first essay, Counting for Worm Theorists, concerns a debate
between different perdurantists about the best way to account for ordi-
nary sentences about counting. This paper is at the intersection of meta-
physics and philosophy of language. Similarly, Perdurantism and Prior-
ity connects perdurantist metaphysics with the literature on grounding
and metaphysical dependence. In that paper, I also discuss some issues
concerning temporal phenomenology and special relativity. The third es-
say, How (Quantum) Things Persist, is a response to some recent argu-
ments that perdurantism is incompatible with non-relativistic quantum
mechanics. So while this thesis is primarily about the metaphysics of per-
sistence, I also seriously engage with some of the literature in philosophy
of language and philosophy of physics.
The first essay, Counting for Worm Theorists, is a defence of the worm
theory of perdurantist semantics. Specifically, I respond to the objection
that the worm theory cannot account for our intuitions about ordinary
counting sentences, such as ‘there are two statues on the plinth’. I suggest
that while Lewis’s version of theworm theory is unsatisfactory, we can still
salvage a different kind of worm theory. I appeal to the standard linguis-
tic phenomena of context dependent quantifier domain restriction. We
can make sense of sentences that require context to supply multiple do-
mains of quantification with situation semantics. In the original problem
cases for the worm theory, the problem is that the theory seems to pre-
dict that there are more objects than our intuitions suggest. If we can find
a principled way to restrict the domain of quantification and reduce the
number of spacetime worms to an appropriate amount, then we can over-
come the apparent problems facing the worm theory. I introduce Sider’s
notion ofmaximal properties and argue that we count objects bymaximal
properties. Suppose that there is some situation in which a is the only F
and some contextual shift generates a restriction to a subsituation. Some
parts of a in the original situation won’t be in the subsituation, so a will
be absent. However, this doesn’t mean that there are no F s in the subsitu-
ation. A large part of a, the object b, can be a maximal F ∗ and can satisfy
F when evaluated with respect to this subsituation.The relevant subsitua-
8 introduction
tion is fixed by context and is often explicitly laid out with phrases like ‘to-
morrow’ and ‘in the room’. This allows us to predict the truth of ordinary
counting sentences in cases of fission and time travel without harming
perdurantist ontology. By relying a littlemore heavily on the technicalma-
chinery of situation semantics, my version of the worm theory provides
accurate predictions of ‘event-related’ counting sentences and a unified se-
mantics of object-and event-related counting. My worm theory does well
enough to eliminate old motivations for adopting a stage theory of count-
ing. I argue that the standard version of the stage theory falls prey to sim-
ilar problems as Lewis’s worm theory. Furthermore, Emanuel Viebahn’s
sophisticated version of the stage theory is problematic because it requires
him to posit an extra constraint on quantifier domain restriction and it
isn’t clear how his invocation of indeterminacy generates the right pre-
dictions. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the worm theory can provide a
genuine account of our intuitions about ordinary counting sentences and
does a better job than its stage-theoretic alternatives.
Perdurantism and Priority, focuses on the ways that perdurantist the-
ories may differ with respect to their stances on metaphysical priority. I
outline parts-first, no-priority, and wholes-first versions of perdurantism.
Contra Valerio Buonomo and Mark Heller, I suggest that these views are
generally compatible with both the stage theory and the worm theory. I
argue that parts-first perdurantism ought to be considered the ‘default’
view, part of the general package of perdurantism and mereological uni-
versalism. A parts-first view plays a useful role in securing mereological
innocence and by extension, the innocence of mereological universalism.
Then, I consider a version of wholes-first perdurantism where objects
have temporal parts but persist in virtue of having a single, temporally ex-
tended exact location. However, I argue that this view seems to enjoy no
serious advantage over transdurantism. We could also have a version of
wholes-first perdurantismwhere objects still persist in virtue of their tem-
poral parts. This may be preferable for some perdurantists who endorse
restricted composition or priority monism. I suggest that no-priority per-
durantism could potentially be motivated with an appeal to an appar-
ent incompatibility between irreflexive priority and strict composition as
identity. However, Roberto Loss develops a convincing reply to this argu-
ment.
Many perdurantists differ in their respective accounts of temporal phe-
nomenology and both Buonomo and Heller claim that these differences
emerge from differences between parts-first, no-priority, and wholes-first
perdurantism. In contrast, I think that it is not clear that any particu-
lar phenomenological argument wins out. Furthermore, priority may not
play any serious role in these debates in the first place. Where disagree-
ments over priority do seem to matter is when considering some sce-
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narios in Minkowski spacetime. The frame-relativity of simultaneity en-
tails that temporal parts are not relativistically invariant, whereas four-
dimensional entities are. I also consider an variation on an argument
by Yuri Balashov which suggests that wholes-first perdurantism provides
a superior explanation of why collections of three-dimensional shapes
are unified in four dimensions. Despite this, I contend that both multi-
locative endurantists and parts-first perdurantists have a principled way
to respond to Balashov. Furthermore, parts-first perdurantists can avoid
the argument against the relativistic invariance of temporal parts by con-
sidering spatiotemporal parts in a relativistic setting. Parts-first perduran-
tists ought to endorse the priority of spatiotemporal parts, which can be
temporal parts or spatial parts from different frames of reference, over
their fusions. I conclude that perdurantists who endorse the general per-
durantist package including the B-theory and mereological universalism
ought to adopt spatiotemporal parts-first perdurantism.
In the final essay, I evaluate some recent arguments made by Thomas
Pashby that perdurantism is incompatible with non-relativistic quantum
mechanics. Pashby’s arguments assume the eigenstate-eigenvalue link alo-
ng with completeness, which rules out hidden variable theories like Boh-
mian mechanics. I outline Pashby’s arguments, beginning with his first
argument against quantum temporal parts. I reject Pashby’s claim that
the worm theory and the stage theory are committed to different pictures
of quantum dynamics, since those views agree on the fundamental ontol-
ogy. I also suggest that there are some problems with Pashby’s attempt to
develop a notion of quantum spatial parthood and by extension, quan-
tum temporal parthood, by relativising parthood to location via a locali-
sation scheme that implies quantum holism. Pashby argues that quantum
temporal parts cannot obey temporal translation invariance due to a re-
sult known as Pauli’s Theorem. This theorem rules out the existence of
self-adjoint time operators T canonically conjugate to the Hamiltonian
H , unless the Hamiltonian has a spectrum bounded from below.
I outline Pashby’s second argument which does not rely on his notion
of quantum temporal parts. Pashby’s second argument relies on the same
theorem as his first and provides a ‘no-go’ result for extended temporal
parts. Then, I point out how Pashby’s assumption that we ought to treat
time as an observable motivates his move to an event-ontology. I argue
that Pashby’s event-ontology, which he calls reiterationism, is either an
incredibly confused view or simply a view which collapses into perduran-
tism. Finally, I lay out how we could develop a perdurantist account of
quantumobjects with respect to external spatial and temporal parameters
rather than a time observable. I defend this against Pashby’s suggestion
that this may violate the perdurantist commitment to a strong analogy
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between space and time. I conclude that perdurantism is not incompati-
ble with non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
These three essays comprise a unifiedwhole in the sense that they are all
concernedwith perdurantist theories of persistence.This thesis, taken as a
whole, is an attempt to clarify and refine perdurantism.The latter paper is
relevant to the overall perdurantism-endurantism debate, since I defend
perdurantism against the objection that quantum systems cannot have
temporal parts. The other two are more relevant to intra-perdurantist
debates. The first essay develops and defends a specific perdurantist ap-
proach to semantics. In the second, I develop on a commonly neglected
distinction between different kinds of perdurantism in the second essay.
I hope that most of my use of logical symbolism is self-explanatory. In
Counting for Worm Theorists, I make brief use of the lambda abstrac-
tion employed in situation semantics. In How (Quantum) Things Persist,
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Counting for Worm Theorists
2.1 introduction
Much of the ongoing debate between four-dimensionalists hinges on the
semantics of counting.Many philosophers have argued that theworm the-
ory fails to account for our intuitions about ordinary counting sentences
(Hawley, 2001;Moss, 2012; Sider, 2001a;Viebahn, 2013). Apopularmove
in the literature has been to abandon the worm theory in favour of a dif-
ferent theory, such as the stage theory. In this paper, I address the count-
ing problems facing the worm theory and show that the worm theory can
overcome them. I also argue that the existing alternatives are bested by
my version of the worm theory.
In §4.2, I introduce the general topic of four-dimensionalist seman-
tics and the worm theory. Then, I present the seemingly fatal cases of
synchronic counting that challenge the worm theory. In §4.4, I begin de-
veloping my response to these counting problems by discussing the phe-
nomenon of covert quantifier domain restriction. In §4.5, I argue that we
count by sortals which usually designate maximal properties and that the
worm theory successfully predicts this. In the following section, I explain
the role that maximality and quantifier domain restriction play in my ac-
count. I demonstrate how my version of the worm theory predicts intu-
itive judgements about counting objects. In §3.7, I argue that the worm
theory provides us with the best account of event-related counting as well.
In §2.8, I explain whymy version of a worm theory does a better job in fit-
ting with our ordinary language judgements than the alternatives. I con-
clude that philosophers have prematurely discounted the worm theory
and that we should never gave given up on it in the first place.
2.2 four-dimensionalist semantics
Four-dimensionalism is the view that objects persist by having different
temporal parts at different times. This is roughly analogous to how ob-
jects extend through space by having different spatial parts. Ideally, four-
dimensionalists should be able to render all truths about the ordinary
phenomena of persistence as truths in the four-dimensionalist language
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of fundamental ontology.1 Since there are intuitively true sentences in-
volving persistence, four-dimensionalists need a philosophical semantics
which uses their ontology to predict the truth of these sentences.The orig-
inal four-dimensionalist semantics is known as the worm theory (Lewis,
1986: 202). Worm theorists claim that when ordinary speakers talk about
objects that they are really talking about mereological fusions of tempo-
ral parts. These fusions are known as spacetime worms. The objects that
we describe using predicates, refer to using ordinary terms, and quantify
over using quantifiers are spacetime worms.
On the worm theory, ‘River Torrens’ seems to refer to the sum of its
temporal parts. This sounds fine so far, but how does the worm theory
deal with indexicals and demonstratives? To illustrate this, let’s consider a
situation where a speaker observes the River Torrens flooding and makes
a series of utterances:
(1) a. The River Torrens is flooded.
b. That is flooded.
(2) a. That persists through time.
b. The River Torrens persists through time.
The meaning of a specific use of a demonstrative like ‘that’ is usually
mediated by a certain causal interaction. This causal interaction is be-
tween the speaker and some temporal parts which are concurrent with
the utterance. Most four-dimensionalists accept unrestricted mereological
composition, which is the view that there exists an arbitrary mereological
sum for every plurality of objects. This means that there are many differ-
ent mereological sums which have the concurrent temporal parts of the
River Torrens as parts.2 Hence there are multiple candidate referents for a
demonstrative, so which candidate is the referent of a specific use of ‘that’
needs to be determined by the context of the utterance. This is a prob-
lem if the standard contextual mechanisms we use, like disambiguating
reference by spatial location, cannot resolve the ambiguity.
The worm theory predicts the meaning of complex sentences by fig-
uring out whether the predicate used can be satisfied by a short-lived
stage of an object or only by an object throughout its entire existence.
We can make sense of this disjunctive approach by using the stage- and
individual-level predicate distinction (Carlson, 1977). For a predicate to
be stage-level means that it is satisfied by a temporal stage of an individ-
ual. In the case of (1a), the predicate ‘is flooded’ is stage-level because it is
1 It would be very costly if four-dimensionalists needed to accept extensive revisions in
ordinary judgement, although see Moss (2012) for a four-dimensionalist error theory of
ordinary counting.
2 This holds for anyone who accepts unrestricted mereological composition, not just four-
dimensionalists.
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satisfied by a limited part of the River Torrens’s lifespan. Lingering predi-
cates like ‘is flooding’ are also stage-level for the same reason. In the case
of (2b), the predicate ‘persists’ is satisfied at all times where the River Tor-
rens exists. So, predicates like ‘persists’ and ‘is a river’ are only satisfied at
the individual-level. Both stage-level and individual-level predicates can
be held by spacetime worms of differing durations, but the way that pred-
icates get satisfied by objects differs depending on whether a stage- or
individual-level predicate is used. At the individual level, this is very sim-
ple. (2b) is true iff the River Torrens has the property of existing at more
than one time, which it clearly does. Dealing with stage-level predicates is
a little more complicated. (1a) is true iff the River Torrens has the com-
plex property of having a temporal part which is flooded at the time of
utterance.
2.3 counting worries for the worm theory
If we ask something like, ‘How many things exist?’, the worm theorist re-
sponds, ‘However many (fusions of) temporal parts exist’.3 We get this
answer because terms for ordinary objects denote spacetime worms, so
variables that range over persisting things can be allocated to any space-
time worm of arbitrary duration. Two spacetime worms are identical iff
they share the exact same parts.⁴ Ordinary conversations don’t normally
make use of an unrestricted domain of quantification. An unrestricted
quantifier domain is useful for philosophical discussions regarding fun-
damental ontology, but it is rarely employed in ordinary conversation.
Ordinary counting involves counting the number of ordinary things
that satisfy a specific sortal predicate. For some ordinary counting ques-
tions, the worm theory seems to provide unintuitive answers. Specifically,
the worm theory struggles with cases of coincidence and fission.
Suppose that we observe a single boat, known as ‘Popeye’, traversing the
River Torrens. Now, let’s also suppose that this is a case of fission where
Popeye, ‘like an amoeba, divides’ (Parfit, 1984: 254). Popeye is about to
split symmetrically into two boats, although it hasn’t undergone fission
yet. Even before it does, the worm theory predicts that the answer to (4a)
is ‘two’ while the intuitive answer is ‘one’:
(3) a. How many boats are traversing the River Torrens?
b. One. / #Two.
The worm theory also struggles to deal with cases of coincidence. Con-
sider the famous case of Lumpl and Goliath (Gibbard, 1975). An artist
3 In fact, all four-dimensionalists who accept classical mereology will have this answer.
4 This includes spatial as well as temporal parts.
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takes a lump of clay and names it ‘Lumpl’. Then, the artist sculpts the Bib-
lical figure Goliath out of the lump. Now we have two things, Lumpl and
Goliath, which occupy the same space at the same time. There are two
salient spacetimeworms sharing the relevant temporal part in that region.
We have Goliath and then we have Lumpl, which came into existence be-
fore Goliath and is therefore distinct from it.⁵ When Lumpl and Goliath
coincide, the worm theory predicts that the answer to (4a) is ‘two’. How-
ever, there is some intuitive appeal in being able to say that there is only
one thing there and that the lump of clay is the statue:⁶
(4) a. How many things are there?
b. One. / #Two.
The problem is clear: the worm theory provides us with inaccurate pre-
dictions about our ordinary counting judgements. The most well-known
attempt at a defence of the worm theory comes from David Lewis. In re-
sponse to these problems, he outlines a novel theory of counting. Lewis
argues that we often count two non-identical objects as one and the same:
If an infirm man wishes to know how many roads he must cross to
reach his destination, I will count by identity-along-his-path rather than
by identity. By crossing the Chester A. Arthur Parkway and Route 137
at the brief stretch where they have merged, he can cross both by cross-
ing only one road. Yet these two roads are certainly not identical. (Lewis,
1983a: 63–4)
In the same way that we count overlapping roads as one road, we also
count overlapping boats as one boat. Here we count, not by strict identity,
but by a looser relation like identity-along-our-path. We count things by
our encounters with them. This normally gives the same predictions as
the view that counting is by identity, except in these weird cases of co-
incidence and fission. Lewis’ view is often conceived as a semantic the-
ory where the truth conditions of ordinary counting sentences are never
given in terms of strict identity.⁷ If we take Lewis’ theory as a purely se-
mantic one, then we are left with a deeply revisionary view of counting.
Many philosophers are unwilling to accept this approach. Sider explicitly
states that ‘part of the meaning of ‘counting’ is that counting is by iden-
tity’ (Sider, 2001a: 189) In the literature on the semantics of counting sen-
tences, it is almost always assumed that we count by identity. Lewis’ the-
5 They are also distinct because they have different modal properties. Lumpl can survive
being squashed but Goliath cannot.
6 There is a separate, extensive discussion regarding how to make sense of this answer
(Lewis, 1983a; Unger, 1979; Wiggins, 1968). Regardless, it is undeniable that ‘one’ has
some prima facie appeal as an answer to (4a).
7 As opposed to the tenseless counting sentences uttered by metaphysicians, which do
concern strict identity.
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ory of counting does avoid the problem, but at the cost of rejecting this
assumption.
López de Sa argues that Lewis’ view might be more accurately under-
stood as a purely pragmatic theory (López de Sa, 2014). On this view, our
intuitive answers to questions like (3a) and (4a) are false, strictly speaking.
However, our intuitive answers are still ‘true enough’ in ordinary contexts.
Loosely counting by relations of partial indiscernibility instead of strictly
counting by identity is appropriate in most conversations. This pragmatic
reading of Lewis leaves us with a slightly different theory. We normally
count by identity, but sometimes we approximate by weaker relations.
Our counting judgements are strictly false but loosely true. Still, this the-
ory is unsatisfactory. First, we don’t have a great idea of how strictly false
claims become loosely true andwhat ‘loose truth’ even is when it comes to
counting. This account also fails to give us any genuine predictions about
ordinary counting sentences. Instead, we’re left with an ad-hoc account
which tells us that we normally count by identity but do something else
whenever the worm theory seems to run into problems. The pragmatic
view is revisionary because it tells us that, in certain cases, we aren’t ‘re-
ally’ counting properly even if we think we are. Furthermore, it is unclear
what mechanisms we can use to predict loose readings of counting sen-
tences. Both the semantic and pragmatic view leave four-dimensionalists
with plenty to worry about.
Metaphysicians have largely abandoned the worm theory in the face of
these problems.⁸ However, I suggest that the worm theory has been too
readily dismissed. I argue that the worm theory, once supplemented with
some fairly standard linguistic machinery, can provide a genuine account
of ordinary counting.
2.4 quantif ier domain restrict ion
Counting sentences evince a kind of context dependence. Specifically,
I contend that the kind of context dependence they exhibit can induce
quantifier domain restriction. The phenomenon of quantifier domain re-
striction is a standard feature of ordinary discourse. Consider an ordinary
utterance of (5):
(5) Every bottle is on the shelf.
Intuitively, there are true utterances of (5). For (5) to turn out true
doesn’t require every bottle in the world to be on the shelf, because ev-
ery quantifies over relatively few of the world’s bottles. So, it follows that
8 See (Hawley, 2001), (Moss, 2012), (Sider, 2001a) and (Viebahn, 2013) for examples.
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we evaluate utterances of sentences with quantified expressions with re-
spect to restricted quantifier domains and that context supplies the do-
main (Stanley and Williamson, 1995: 291).
Counting sentences also exhibit quantifier domain restriction. Con-
sider the example of an utterance of (5) followed by an utterance of (6):
(6) There are billions of bottles.
This would be infelicitous, since there aren’t billions of bottles sitting
on the shelf in the domain contextually determined by (5). If counting
sentences weren’t subject to contextually fixed domain restriction, then
the invariant domain for bottles would have to contain relatively few of
the world’s bottles. Hence, there would be no true utterances of (6). Since
there are, it’s clear that counting sentences do exhibit quantifier domain
restriction. Consider a simple counting sentence like:
(7) There exist n F s.
In some context c, (7) expresses the proposition: in domain d, there are
n (non-identical) F s.
There are caseswhere simple quantifier domain restrictiondoesn’twork.
Suppose that a group of party goers discuss the behaviour of the guests af-
ter a party. Alice and Bob were both uninvited gatecrashers who annoyed
all of the invited guests. Someone utters:
(8) Exactly two people annoyed everyone.
Intuitively, there is a reading of (8) which is true even if Alice and Bob
didn’t annoy each other (or themselves). To explain (8), we need context
to supply multiple domains (Soames, 1986: 357). More specifically, we
need to arrive at something like: ‘in domain d1, there are exactly two peo-
ple who annoyed everyone in domain d2’.
Oneway of dealingwith (8) is by employing situation semantics (Kratzer,
2019). In situation semantics, sentences are evaluated with respect to a
mere part of a possible world or a situation. In accounting for sentences
like (8),many versions of situation semantics suggest associate an implicit
situation variable with noun phrases while also allowing for verb phrases
to introduce an implicit situation variable associated with the topic sit-
uation (Kratzer, 2019). The topic situation of (8) is merely the part of
the world where the party took place. (8) is true iff exactly two people
annoyed everyone in the part of that situation which only includes the
invitees. To account for ‘donkey anaphora’ like ‘Every man who owns a
donkey beats it’, predicates have covert situation arguments in the syn-
tax. Roughly put, this means that different predicates in a single sentence
can be evaluated with respect to different situations. Situation semantics
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gives us exactly what we need. We have a plausible mechanism that can
reproduce our intuitive judgements. In the remainder of this paper, I’ll
be making use of situation semantics – albeit without relying too heavily
on the technical details.⁹
The familiar phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction allows for
utterances structured along the lines of ‘There are exactly n F s’ to be true
so long as the context allows us to neglect counting non-salient F s which
aren’t in the topic situation. Quantifier domain restriction is exactly what
the worm theory needs to deal with both problem cases. Recall that in
the coincidence and fission cases, the worm theory counted two distinct
spacetime worms. In the domain of the entire world, it is true that there
really are two distinct spacetime worms in both cases. However, if ordi-
nary counting sentences under discussion exhibit quantifier domain re-
striction, then the worm theory might be able to predict the truth of our
ordinary judgements about counting. This is regardless of whether there
really are multiple objects in those cases on a fundamental level.
In both problem cases, the worm theory seems to predict that there
are more objects than our intuitions suggest. The obvious move here is to
restrict the domain of quantification and reduce the number of spacetime
worms until we predict the right amount. In the following sections, I will
explain precisely how context dependence operates in both cases and how
this all works in relation to theworm theory. To start with, I will introduce
maximality and how it relates to the sortal predicates featured in ordinary
counting sentences.
2.5 counting sortals and maximality
A property F is maximal iff large parts of any F aren’t themselves F s
(Sider, 2001b: 357). For example, being a chair is maximal while chair-
minus, a thing that shares all the parts of a chair aside from a single leg,
isn’t a chair. Chair-minus is really just a large part of an object which
is a chair. In fact, Sider notes that many ordinary sortal predicates desig-
natemaximal properties (Sider, 2001b: 357). Large proper parts of people,
dogs, cats, houses etc. aren’t themselves people, dogs, cats, houses etc., so
these properties are maximal.
For any maximal property F there is a related possibly non-maximal
property, F*. x is an F* iff there is some possible situation in which an
intrinsic duplicate of x is F . In the chair example, chair-minus is a chair*
because there is a possible situation where the chair’s leg was removed
9 One might want to use Stanley and Szabó’s covert domain variable approach instead
(Stanley and Szabó, 2000). This makes no serious difference to my arguments; situation
semantics just makes some things easier to explain.
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and there would be a chair which is an intrinsic duplicate of the present
chair-minus. In other words, chair-minus could turn out to be a chair if
things go the right way.
Ordinary counting judgements are fairly intuitive. Ordinary counting
questions usually involve someone asking how many people, dogs, cats,
houses etc. there are in a given situation. And we do tend to find that an-
swering these questions is fairly straightforward. If the ordinary sortals in-
volved in countingwere non-maximal, wewould find such questions very
puzzling. Suppose that we observed a lone chair and were asked to count
the number of things that satisfied chair*. The chair could lose a leg, an
armrest, its upholstery and so on, while still satisfying chair*. The same is
true for other objects too. So, we would end up with answers that are very
different to the ones that we normally provide and those answers would
be farmore difficult to figure out.This all suggests that we count objects by
maximal properties and not by their related intrinsic non-maximal prop-
erties. When we count objects, we usually count by sortals which usually
designate maximal properties.
The worm theory predicts this. Four-dimensionalist ontology entails
that there are arbitrary temporally extended parts of spacetime worms. If
being a chair was a non-maximal property, then the worm theory should
entail that for every chair, there are many chairs whose entire lives are
identical to some long part of the original chair. No worm theorist would
endorse this, so they need to hold that counting sortals are maximal in
order to provide the right predictions for any counting sentences.
2.6 counting objects
Recall that four-dimensionalism posits the existence of arbitrary mereo-
logical sums of temporal parts. Variables take such things as values and
these values are restricted quantifier domains. Noun phrases are associ-
ated with an implicit situation variable, while verb phrases introduce an
implicit situation variable which is associated with the topic situation. In
all cases, restriction is encoded by evaluating the restricted expressions
at a sentential or subsentential level with respect to a salient subsituation.
The upshot is that the quantifier domain can have less of the simplest
temporal parts than the amount included in the ‘fundamental’ domain.
In virtue of this, the domain of entities quantified over contains fewer
mereological sums because all appropriate domains of any subsituation
are usually closed under arbitrary mereological fusion and decomposi-
tion.However, sometimeswemightwant to omit counting these arbitrary
fusions and so we can have some domains of subsituations which aren’t
closed under fusion.
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Now, I will explain the role that maximality plays in my account. Sup-
pose there is some situation in which a is the only F and some shift in the
context generates a restriction to a subsituation. Some parts of a, which
were in the original situation, will be absent from the subsituation. Hence,
a itself will be absent. However, this doesn’t necessarily entail that there
are no F s in the subsituation. This is because an object b, which is a large
part of a and is an F*, is present in the restricted domain. Object b can
be a maximal F* because there is no y such that b + y is F* in the subsit-
uation. When we evaluate b relative to this subsituation, it can satisfy F .
In other words, objects which aren’t F may nevertheless be sufficient to
satisfy F when evaluated relative to a subsituation.
The relevant subsituation is fixed by context. In some cases, the tempo-
ral location of the situation is explicitly laid out using phrases like ‘yester-
day’, ‘within the next hour’ and so on. In other cases like (5) (‘Every bot-
tle is on the shelf.’), the use of the present tense informs us that the topic
situation is a present one. Without any other topical current situation,
the utterance situation is the obvious fallback. The explicit spatiotempo-
ral boundaries of utterance situations are unclear. We do know, however,
that (5) can be uttered truly in some brief window of time between cases
where all the bottles aren’t on the shelf. So, we still know that these spa-
tiotemporal boundaries can be as restrictive as we need them to be.
All of this allows the worm theory to adequately deal with both prob-
lem cases. Consider the coincidence of Lumpl and Goliath. Now, suppose
that we point to the plinth and say:
(9) There is exactly one object on the plinth.
(9) is true iff there is only one thing in the relevant situation.Thepresent
tense of the utterance means that the situation must be a present one and
‘on the plinth’ explicitly provides the spatial location of the relevant situa-
tion. Hence, the present situation in (9) is that part of the world including
only the plinth at the present moment. In that situation, there is only one
object: a lone, maximal spacetime worm which is a shared part of Lumpl
and Goliath.1⁰ This also makes the following utterance true:
(10) The lump of clay on the plinth is identical to the statue on the
plinth.
(10) turns out true because the referents of those sortal descriptions
are two spacetime worms which are restricted to the present situation.
When restricted, those two sortal descriptions pick out the same single
spacetime worm. One might worry that this solution creates a difficulty
10 Ignoring the micro-level objects that we usually neglect to count like arbitrary fusions
of molecules and the coincident Lumpl/Goliath.
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thanks to the modal differences between lumps of clay and statues. The
lump of clay can survive being squashed, but the statue cannot. In this
restricted situation, the shared temporal part of the lump and the statue
turn out to be both a lump and a statue. So, we need to invoke modal
counterpart theory to explain how maximal spacetime worms get their
modal properties (Lewis, 1968).
On modal counterpart theory, an object x has the property of possi-
bly being F iff a counterpart of x in some possible world has F . We can
apply modal counterpart theory to this case. In a world where the coin-
cident Lumpl and Goliath are squashed, the counterpart of Lumpl per-
sists and the counterpart of Goliath doesn’t. Lewis notes that unlike iden-
tity, any counterpart relation ‘will not, in general, be an equivalence rela-
tion’ (Lewis, 1968: 115). So, we can account for sentences like (10) along
with sentences like ‘the lump of clay on the plinth will survive squashing,
while the statuewill not’.We could also deal with themodal differences be-
tween lumps of clay and statues by appealing to the less-restricted worm
of which they are part.
The fission case can be dealt with in a similar way. Suppose that we
observe Popeye traversing the River Torrens before it undergoes fission
and that we utter the following:
(11) There is exactly one boat traversing the River Torrens.11
(11) is true iff there is only one boat in the relevant situation. Again,
the present tense and explicit spatial location provide us with the relevant
situation. In the relevant situation, there is only one maximal spacetime
worm because the future temporal parts of the fissioned boats aren’t in-
cluded.
The role that tense plays in fixing the topic situation ensures that most
present tense claims will have very brief topic situations. Ordinary count-
ing sentences like (11) have topic situations too brief to include instances
of objects undergoing fission or coincident objects diverging. Thanks to
role that maximality plays in my account, the maximal spacetime worm
in (11) can instantiate the individual-level predicate ‘boat’. In these cases,
we avoid double-counting overlapping objects in ordinary quantifier do-
mains.
One might raise an apparent problem case for my view as I’ve devel-
oped it so far. Specifically, this is a problem for combining my proposal
about how tense and aspect determine the relevant quantifier domain
with the worm theory. Suppose that in the coincidence case, Lumpl was
immediately dug out of the ground and placed on the plinth. After a rea-
sonably long time, the artist shapes Lumpl into Goliath. Following this,
11 Here, the stage-level predicate ‘traversing’ takes precedence over the individual-level
predicate ‘boat’.
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nothing else ever happens to the plinth and the coinciding Lumpl/Go-
liath. Then, someone utters:
(12) a. Only two things have been on that plinth.
b. They won’t always be there.
Intuitively, (12b) is false because we know that the object on the plinth
will always be there. However, ‘it’ anaphorically refers back to the thing
under discussion in (12a). If the ‘one thing’ in (12a) is amaximal day-long
spacetime worm, then it really won’t be there tomorrow and (12b) will
turn out true. My response to these sorts of problems is to suggest that
sentences like (12b) misfire since they implicitly force (12) as a whole to
share a topic situation which concerns every time.
Ignoring this problem case, I’ve successfully dealt with most cases by
reducing the number of objects which satisfy a specific sortal predicate.
Let’s consider a different case where the restriction of situation doesn’t
involve this. Suppose that someone spends their entire life confined to a
room that no one else may enter. In the room, this person develops a time
machine and travels back to an earlier point in their life.Then, they spend
one hour chatting with their past self. Intuitively, the following two claims
about this situation are correct:
(13) a. One time, there were two people talking to each other in the
room.
b. There has only ever been one person in the room.
(13a) concerns a brief, past situation in the room. It is true iff there
was ever a situation in which two people conversed with each other. By
restricting the time-traveller’s parts to that time where they temporally
overlap themselves, we get two maximal spacetime worms. In contrast,
(13b) concerns a situation including all times at which the room exists. In
that situation, there is only one maximal spacetime worm. The situation
that we must evaluate (13a) with respect to is a part of the larger situation
which (13b) is concerned with. Here, the domain of the smaller situation
is a subset of the larger domain.
2.7 counting events
So far, we’ve been counting objects. Many of the previously discussed
cases posed a prima facie problem for the worm theory because our intu-
itive judgements suggested that there were less objects present that than
worm theory seemed to predict. After supplementing the worm theory
with an appropriate understanding of how ordinary counting sentences
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exhibit quantifier domain restriction, these cases no longer pose a prob-
lem.
However, there are other kinds of ordinary counting which have moti-
vated amove away from the worm theory. Consider the following famous
example:
(14) Four thousand boats passed through the lock last year (Krifka,
1990).12
Manfred Krifka argues that (14) has two readings (Krifka, 1990). The
first is the familiar object-related reading. In that reading, we count four
thousand distinct boats which passed through the lock last year. In the
other reading, we count the number of lock traversals by boats rather than
the number of boats. This other reading doesn’t entail the existence of
four thousand distinct boats, since there may well have been some boats
which passed through the lock twice during the last year. In much the
same way, an airline might report that they had two million passengers
last year and count repeat journeys by the same passenger asmultiple pas-
sengers. These counting sentences are known as event-related counting
sentences, since we seem to be counting events rather than objects.
Event-related counting sentences are a problem for the worm theory
because the temporal location of the topic situation is explicitly provided
by ‘last year’. So, (14) is about a year-long situation and we can restrict
the domain of quantification to spacetime worms in said situation. How-
ever, doing this means that we won’t correctly count the boats that make
multiple lock traversals. This presents a problem for getting the required
event-related reading as a possibility.
Perhaps we can get the event-related reading by evaluating the predi-
cates in (14) with respect to a situation different from the topic situation
of the entire sentence. In order to explain how we can do this and how
it might help, let’s consider a straightforward counting sentence about
teapots:
(15) a. There are three teapots.
b. λs∃x(x ⩽p s∧|{y : y ⩽p x ∧ teapot(y)(s)}| = 3).13 (Kratzer,
2019: §7)
12 Theoriginal example refers to ‘ships’, while I say ‘boats’ in keepingwith the Popeye fission
case discussed earlier in the paper.
13 Note: themeaning of a sentence is a function from situations to truth values. λxF , where
x is the only free variable which occurs in F , designates the function that maps a to> iff
a has the property expressed by F . The reason for doing things like this is that linguistic
expressions can be given a function as their semantic value – and not just functions
from entities to truth values. Furthermore, the syntactic composition of expressions can
be mirrored by successive nested instances of functional application. (15b) is an open
sentence with a covert situation variable and not a closed sentence. ‘⩽p’ denotes the ‘part
of ’ mereological relation.
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Here, (15b) describes a property of a situation s that has three parts as
teapots, relative to s. (15a) is true, relative to s, iff there is a part of that
situation which has three parts and those parts are teapots. ‘Teapot’ is a
standard sortal predicate and hence, it is also maximal. (15b) evaluates
whether an object satisfies the sortal ‘teapot’ with respect to situation s,
which is normally the topic situation of (15a).




s ⩽p last year ∧ x ⩽p s ∧
∣∣{y : y ⩽p x ∧ boat(y)(s)
∧ traversed the lock(y)(s)
}∣∣ = 4000).
(16) tells us that there is part of the topic situation of (14) including four
thousand boats, which are distinct with respect to the topic situation s. In
that subsituation, each distinct boat makes a lock traversal. We can also
provide a different reading of (14), where the situation variable associated








Now we can consider a scattered situation which only includes the
parts of the world where lock traversals take place.1⁵ This scattered ob-
ject contains four thousand lock traversals as parts, which leaves us with
a maximal spacetime worm for each lock traversal. Each maximal space-
time worm does not stand in the correct same-boat-as relation to any
boat in any other traversal of the lock. Many of the boat parts needed for
multiple candidate boats to stand in the correct genidentity-constituting
relation over time are absent from this subsituation. Chris Barker notes
that these parts are absent because basic logistics entails that there is a
fairly long interval between two lock traversals made by a single boat
(Barker, 1999). Sincemaximality does not prevent us from counting what
are fundamentally proper parts of boats as boats, we can count four thou-
sand boats in this subsituation. One might notice that this is similar to
what was happening with (13a): ‘One time, there were two people talking
to each other in the room.’ In (13a), we could get the intuitive count by
counting what are fundamentally proper parts of persons in a restricted
situation.
14 ‘Boat’ is a two-place predicate here because a boat is only a boat relative to a situation
where there is no bigger part of it present.
15 We shouldn’t do this in all cases. If there is a case where four thousand boats traverse
two locks in a lock system, we still might want to be able to say ‘four thousand boats
passed through the lock last year’. In that case, the situation under consideration won’t
be a scattered one.
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I’ve explained how this sort of reading is plausible;My next task is to ex-
plain why we really should evaluate the sortal predicate ‘boat’ in (14) with
respect to a restricted situation. My reasoning in this case is this subsit-
uation is fairly intuitive. Suppose that someone was stationed at the lock
last year. Presumably, that person is in a great position to evaluate claims
with respect to this particular subsituation. In fact, they would probably
have a much easier time evaluating claims with respect to this subsitua-
tion rather than the topic situation. This is because boats are difficult to
conclusively reidentify, especially given that there are fairly long intervals
between two lock traversals. It makes more sense to count by easily dis-
criminated boat traversals with a common spatial location than attempt
to track boats over the long periods of timewhere they are absent from the
lock. My explanation about why this subsituation is a natural candidate
to saturate the situation variable on ‘ship’ is very similar to an explanation
offered in support of Barker’s account:
It is no accident that the best examples of this phenomenon concern
situations in which there are too many individuals to keep track of eas-
ily…In [(14)], for example, logistical facts guarantee that a given ship
will return to the lock only after several weeks’ worth of similar vessels
have passed through. (Barker, 1999: 689–90)
In Barker’s account, this means that when we fail to recognise that
two stages are part of the same object then our semantic interpretation
should make the same mistake. He simply adds this constraint as an addi-
tional rule. Instead, I hold that the epistemic situation we find ourselves
in makes it appropriate to evaluate sentences with respect to certain epis-
temically available subsituations. Epistemically available subsituations in
any given context are naturally available to saturate situation variables. A
minor advantage of my account over Barker’s is that it provides this ex-
planation of why and how these epistemic factors play such a role.
Admittedly, my account of event-related counting is more reliant on
the technical machinery of situation semantics than preceding sections
of this paper. As such, my account of event-related counting is more vul-
nerable to criticisms of situation semantics. There is one key advantage
of exploiting the formal apparatus of situation semantics in my account.
Namely, my account renders event-related counting an ordinary kind of
object-related counting. We count ordinary objects that satisfy ordinary
sortal predicates in my account of ‘event-related counting’. The two read-
ings of the sentence are predicted by the different binding of the covert sit-
uation variables in the syntax.Another advantage ofmy viewover Barker’s
is that we don’t need to invoke any extra novel semantic tools. Barker’s
account, like mine, permits context to to fix the extension of predicates
like ‘boat’ and also requires ordinary counting sortals to be maximal. The
issue with Barker’s account is that he needs to provide a disjunctive in-
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terpretation of the quantifiers. In his account, operators can ‘quantify ei-
ther over individuals or over stages of individuals, subject to pragmatic
appropriateness’ (Barker, 1999: 684). In contrast, my account entails that
quantifiers always range over boats. Combining covert domain restriction
withmaximality just sometimes happens to permit some thingswhich are
boat*s to be maximal boats. This isn’t dissimilar from Barker’s view that
‘boat’ sometimes refers to a boat-stage, but my account avoids invoking
a disjunctive interpretation of quantifiers. Another issue with Barker’s ac-
count is that he invokes different kinds of ‘identity’ relations. Sometimes
we count by boat stages and sometimes we count by boats. This seems to
run into the same worry that befell Lewis’ revisionary theory of counting.
Counting, by definition, is by strict identity and not by other relations.
This is all well and good, but then how do we explain utterances of 17?
(17) Four thousand different boats passed through the lock last year.
Barker claims that ‘different N ’ subsumes the different stages of the
same N into one (Barker, 1999: 690). This identity criterion works for
his view, which allows us to sometimes count by boat stages even when
boats are in the domain of quantification. (17) forces us to count by boats
instead of boat stages. Inmy account, there really are four-thousand, non-
identical boats in the epistemically relevant subsituation. To deal with sen-
tences like (17), I suggest that ‘differentN ’ forces us to evaluate the situa-
tion variable attached toN with respect to the topic situation and not the
subsituation. This gives us the right predictions in these cases.
There is another apparent problem case regarding event-related count-
ing:
(18) a. Four thousand boats passed through the lock last year.
b. Half of thempaid a fee at the next harbour (Barker, 1999: 689).
This problem is intuitively similar to the previously considered prob-
lem for combining my proposal about how tense and aspect fix the rel-
evant domain of quantification with the worm theory. ‘Them’ in (18a)
anaphorically refers back to the boats in (18a) but ‘boats’ in (18a) seems
to pick out boats that only only last as long as a single lock traversal. If
we count boats that are too short-lived to pay a fee at the next harbour,
then (18b) will always turn out false on my account. Intuitively, however,
there are true utterances of (18b). I suggest that as long as the boats we
count in (18a) don’t last over two traversals, there is no reason why we
cannot say that some of them last beyond a traversal. Presumably, epis-
temically salient situations can include boats that persist long enough to
satisfy the predicate traversed the lock and paid a fee at the next harbour.
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Admittedly, I don’t have a principled explanation of how this works in
regards to the formal semantics. Nevertheless, my account does not suf-
fer too much in the face of these problems because other approaches also
struggle to account for anaphora like (18b).
For example,Moss offers a counterpart-theoretic treatment of problem
cases like (18). In her view, we could say that (18a) and (18b) are both
about the same objects. She invokes the existence of temporal counterparts
and suggests that (18b) is true just in case the boats we talk about in (18a)
stand are the past temporal counterparts of the boats that pay a fee at the
next harbour. This might be a convenient response, but it seems to violate
the rule that counting is by identity and not any counterpart-theoretic
surrogate for identity.
One might object that my account is not a genuine worm theory. Con-
sider the following argument against the worm theory made by Moss:
The objects we ordinarily talk about are the same sort of ob-
jects we talk about with event-related counting sentences...[and]
the objects we talk about with event-related counting sentences are
proper temporal parts of individuals (Moss, 2012: 676).
In the context of Moss’ paper, the domain of quantification is unre-
stricted. In that particular context, Moss is right to point out that the
objects we talk about using event-related counting sentences are proper
temporal parts of individuals. She is also correct to say that the objects we
normally talk about, at least by metaphysics paper context standards, are
proper temporal parts of individuals. However, these observations don’t
disadvantage the worm theory. The worm theory is the view that ordi-
nary continuants are spacetime worms. The worm theory does not entail
that if something is a maximal F -satisfying spacetime worm in one con-
text, then it is a maximal F -satisfying spacetime worm in all contexts. On
my account, the worm theory is the view that the objects that we ordinar-
ily quantify over in a context are the objects that satisfy maximal predi-
cates in that particular context. The worm theory is consistent with Moss’
claims being true in the context of utterance. Furthermore, it would be
very odd if the worm theory was incompatible these claims. Consider the
fact thatmost worm theorists are committed to unrestrictedmereological
composition. This means that, in a metaphysics context, there are many
objects quantified over of which almost any spacetime worm we pick out
is a proper part.
Outside of this special context, it ismisleading to say that the objects we
discuss using event-related counting sentences are proper temporal parts
of individuals. Ordinary counting sentences are evaluated with respect
to restricted domains of quantification. These quantifier domains tend to
only include maximal individuals, at least for ordinary sortal predicates.
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Being an individual that gets quantified over just happens to be context-
sensitive. That is a fairly unsurprisingly consequence, once we consider
the standard linguistic phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction.
2.8 the stage theory
The standard four-dimensionalist alternative to the worm theory is the
stage theory (Hawley, 2001; Sider, 2001a). While the worm theory says
that the objects we discuss are spacetimeworms, the stage theory says that
the objects we discuss are temporal stages. Recall that the worm theory
gave a simple semantics for individual-level predicates and a slightlymore
involved semantics for stage-level predicates. The stage theory makes the
opposite trade off here. Sentences involving ordinary stage-level predi-
cates are true iff the stage under discussion has the relevant property.
In contrast, dealing with individual-level and lingering stage-level pred-
icates is more convoluted. To provide a semantics for those predicates,
the stage theory posits the existence of temporal counterparts. For a sen-
tence involving those predicates to turn out true, the current stage under
discussion needs to have temporal counterparts that collectively stand in
the right kind of relations to satisfy the relevant predicate. In the case of
persistence, an object persists iff it exists and it has at least one counter-
part at a distinct time.
Temporal counterpart theory is controversial. One may suggest that
the stage theory entails that there is no such thing as persistence. If we talk
about stages which are generally bound to a temporal instant, and there
are no objects at a later time that are identical to any current stage, then it
seems like nothing persists after all. This is known as the Humphrey ob-
jection and it applies to all forms of counterpart theory (Kripke, 1980).
However, it is not obvious that the stage theory entails nihilism about
persistence. Sure, no current object is strictly identical to any future ob-
ject. Nonetheless, the natural language predicate ‘is the same as’ does not
need to denote strict identity and can denote a relation that holds between
stages.
The stage theory has no problem accounting for the fission and coinci-
dence cases. If the sentences in these fission cases quantify over instanta-
neous stages, then we get the intuitive answers without difficulty.
However, the stage theory runs into its own class of counting problems.
Consider a non-fission case wherewe observe the lone ‘Popeye’ traversing
the River Torrens for an hour and someone asks:
(19) a. Howmany boats were traversing the River Torrens during the
last hour?
b. One. /# Infinitely many.
32 counting for worm theorists
If we count instantaneous temporal stages, then there will be infinitely
many of them that satisfy the predicate is a boat within the last hour. It
is not easy to respond to this problem by employing covert quantifier do-
main restriction. Since the stage theory needs individual stages to satisfy
predicates like ‘is a boat’ or ‘is a person’, then any temporally extended sit-
uation will involve counting many more things than an ordinary person
would. Even versions of the stage theory that allow stages to be temporally
extended run into this problem, since any temporal interval that includes
an intrinsic change in any object’s properties will generate a problem.
Without modifying the stage theory, the only potential solution would be
to propose that every sentence, including those with explicit temporal sit-
uations, have a temporally unextended subsituation which provides the
domain. This an unsatisfying solution, especially since it is hard to see
what semantic mechanism can give us that.
A more plausible view is Viebahn’s indeterminately relevant stage the-
ory (Viebahn, 2013). Viebahn’s account begins by positing a basic con-
straint onquantifier domain restriction in order to predict the right counts:
bas ic constraint : The domain of any ordinary use of a quantifier
contains at most one stage out of any maximal class of suitably
counterpart-interrelated stages (Viebahn, 2013: 314).
When counting the number of boats that were traversing the River Tor-
rens during the last hour, we only count one boat per maximal class of
appropriately counterpart-interrelated stages. A stage is relevant for an
utterance of a counting sentence if is located in the quantifier domain of
that sentence or it has suitable temporal counterparts in the domain. We
can arrive at the intuitive answer of ‘one’ in the case of (19) because there
is one class of counterpart-interrelated boat stages that have appropriate
counterparts during the last hour. So, we count exactly one relevant boat
stage.
Viebahn invokes indeterminacywhenhe argues that it is indeterminate
which stages are relevant in regards to a counting sentence, so long as a
maximumof one stage out of anymaximal class of counterpart-interrelated
stages is relevant. One of the reasons he invokes indeterminacy is to deal
with cases where we might want to predict more than one answer. Re-
call the Lumpl and Goliath case discussed earlier in the paper. When
someone looks at the plinth and asks, ‘how many things are there?’, we
might reply with ‘one’ or ‘two’. On one reading, this case is concerned
with one maximal class of counterpart-interrelated stages. The relevant
stage in one class is located at a time where Lumpl and Goliath coincide,
so it must also be the relevant stage for the other class and the answer is
‘one’. However, on Viebahn’s account it is indeterminate which individ-
ual stage is counted. Someone might ask, ‘how many things are there?’,
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but be particularly concerned with the modal distinction between Lumpl
and Goliath. In these circumstances, the relevant stages for both classes
are located at times where they don’t coincide. So ‘two’ will be the appro-
priate answer (Viebahn, 2013: 321). The same goes for our boat fission
case. If we observe ‘Popeye’ traversing the River Torrens yesterday and
it undergoes fission this morning, Viebahn suggests we can answer ‘how
many boats were traversing the River Torrens yesterday?’ with ‘two’ if we
are concerned with current boats.
It is unclear how indeterminacy generates these results. In the coinci-
dence case, it seems determinate that utterances of ‘two’ must pick out
stages that aren’t shared by both Lumpl and Goliath. In the fission case, it
also seems determinate that utterances of ‘two’ must pick out stages tem-
porally located after fission. It is unclear what semanticmechanism allows
sentences explicitly about ‘yesterday’ to pick out stages located at a differ-
ent interval. If it truly is indeterminate which stages are relevant, then
we don’t have a reliable means of predicting ‘one’ or ‘two’ depending on
context. Instead, it seems that the answer must always be indeterminate
between ‘one’ and ‘two’. In contrast, my account provides a semantically
principledmeans of predicting the right counts in different contexts with-
out invoking indeterminacy.
A more minor worry is that Viebahn’s view that we count one individ-
ual stage per maximal class of counterpart-interrelated stages is less intu-
itive than the worm theory. In cases of temporally extended situations, it
makes more sense to claim that we usually count temporally extended ob-
jects instead of counting some indeterminately locatedmaximal classes of
counterpart-interrelated stages.
My most serious worry is that Viebahn’s basic constraint is semanti-
cally unprincipled. Viebahn wants to count by identity and not by some
kind of counterpart-theoretic surrogate for identity. So, he posits the ba-
sic constraint to force the domain of quantification to only include one
stage per maximal class of suitably counter-interrelated stages. However,
Viebahn offers no semantically principled reason for adopting the basic
constraint. The basic constraint is simply posited so that stage theorists
can avoid overcounting.
In contrast, my account doesn’t involve positing any extra constraint
on quantifier domain restriction. With an appropriate understanding of
situation semantics and maximality, my account can generate the appro-
priate counts without requiring any ad-hoc or novel constraints.
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2.9 conclusion
I have mounted a successful defence of the worm theory and demon-
strated that it can provide a genuine account of our intuitions about or-
dinary counting sentences. I have done this by invoking the standard lin-
guistic phenomenon of covert quantifier domain restriction and supple-
menting the worm theory with situation semantics. My version of the
worm theory makes our intuitive judgements come out as true, while
also offering a unified account of object- and event-related counting sen-
tences. Furthermore, the worm theory does better a better job than its
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In this essay I focus on a commonly neglected difference between differ-
ent kinds of perdurantism, which are differences in mereological priority.
In this paper, I discuss three different views: parts-first perdurantism, no-
priority perdurantism, and wholes-first perdurantism. I briefly outline all
three views and some of themotivations for each of them. I fend off objec-
tions from and motivations for no-priority perdurantism. I also contend
that intra-perdurantist debates about phenomenology, which have been
framed with respect to these forms of perdurantism in the past, ought not
to be. Instead, I suggest that the relativity of simultaneity in Minkowski
spacetime presents a more interesting scenario for these disagreements
about priority.
3.2 mereological priority
Mereology is the study of part-whole relations. When thinking about the
metaphysics of parts and wholes for ordinary objects, mereology plays a
crucial role. Of particular importance to metaphysicians are issues con-
cerning how, when, and why parts compose or constitute a mereological
whole. The most infamous problem regarding mereological composition
is the special composition question: Under which conditions do some parts
x compose y?
The two ‘radical’ responses to the special composition question are
mereological nihilism andmereological universalism (Varzi, 2019: §4).Mere-
ological nihilists reject parthood.There are no circumstances underwhich
some parts x compose y. Mereological universalists run in the opposite
direction. They believe that composition is unrestricted. For any two ob-
jects, there exists a further object that is composed of the two. The vast
majority of perdurantists endorse mereological universalism.1 Perduran-
tists with a temporal parts ontology without committing to the existence
of spacetimeworms or nihilist stage theorists should endorsemereological
nihilism or a restrictedmereology that excludes spacetime worms.2Mere-
ological nihilism is a very natural, parsimonious choice for the nihilist
1 See (Lewis, 1986), (Hawley, 2001), (Sider, 2001a) for some prominent examples.
2 See (Patrone, 2020) and possibly also (Sider, 2013).
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stage theorist. It is harder to see how one might justify a nihilist stage the-
ory while permitting other fusions and it may be difficult to justify that
kind of view.3 There are also a minority of moderate perdurantists, such
as Yuri Balashov (2003), who endorse some restrictions on diachronic fu-
sions.
Another key issue is the problem of mereological priority.This problem
is about whether there is any relation of priority between proper parts and
wholes.⁴ Do wholes exist in virtue of their parts, do parts exist in virtue
of their wholes, or is there no priority relation involved in parthood? Ini-
tially, the first answer seems most tempting: parts compose wholes, so
wholes ontologically depend on their parts. It’s fairly intuitive to think
that a house is built out of bricks and that those bricks ‘come before’ the
house.
On the other hand, one might think that structured wholes or genuine
unities pose a counter-example. Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphists, for ex-
ample, think that a whole is not merely a collection of material parts.
Rather, genuine unities also have a form or some essential principle of
unity. Some peoplemight think that the bricks, even though it is somehow
important to the house, is less fundamental than more abstract features
like its social function or its shape.⁵We can also consider prioritymonists,
who believe that the universe as a whole is basic and that its parts are
derivative.⁶ Even then, these views do not entail a full-blown wholes-first
theory of mereological priority. Most hylomorphists have not endorsed a
wholes-first view and priority monism only requires that the universe is
a whole which grounds the existence of its parts (Schaffer, 2010a). It may
be the case that structured wholes are prior and their parts are posterior,
but the opposite may apply to mere arbitrary fusions.
But what exactly is priority supposed to be? A fairly natural way to cash
this out would be in terms of grounding. My talk of things existing or hav-
ing some property in virtue of something else is amenable to most no-
3 One strategy might be to think that fusion can take place at times but not across times.
That way, we would have a sharp principled distinction between permissible and im-
permissible fusions that permits a stage theory. This might not be a bad option, since
stage theorists tend to take ‘unity’ over time as something to be cashed out counterpart
theoretically anyway.
4 Any notion of priority between improper parts and their wholes would be difficult to
make sense of. I assume that priority is irreflexive, that is to say, something cannot be
more fundamental than or be prior to itself. I generally use ‘part’ throughout this paper
to mean ‘proper part’.
5 See (Armstrong, 1986), (Fine, 2010), (Koslicki, 2018) for some examples of Neo-
Aristotelian views.
6 (Schaffer, 2010a) is an example of a modern priority monist. Significant antecedents
may include classical philosophers like Parmenides and Plotinus, along with modern
philosophers like Baruch Spinoza and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. See (Joad, 1957)
and (Schaffer, 2010b) for some thoughts on the history of priority monism.
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tions of entity grounding.⁷ I take it for granted here that grounding im-
poses a strict partial ordering on the things in its domain. In other words,
grounding is asymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive. My goal here is not
to defend a specific version of grounding or argue that some particular
form of grounding is the best for explaining mereological priority. If you
find grounding unattractive, feel free to treat my talk of priority as talk
about a more palatable irreflexive relation.⁸
Alternatively, onemay reject any notion ofmereological priority.There
is no priority relation that comes pre-packaged with the theory of mere-
olgy, understood as first-order logic plus someprimitive relation and some
definitions. If we define parthood in terms of overlap, which might be
more intuitively read as a relation between entities at the same level, then
our mereology might not involve any priority at all.⁹ One might want to
keep a ‘neutral’ theory of mereology without adding other relations like
grounding. There are also worries that irreflexive notions of priority are
incompatible with various premises that we need to secure classical mere-
ology (Bailey, 2011). Moreover, there are metaphysical skeptics who are
wary of ‘dark notions’ of metaphysical priority tout court like Judith Jarvis
Thomson (Thomson, 1983: 211).
I will address some of these issues in this paper. In what follows, I ap-
ply the question of mereological priority to perdurantist theories of per-
sistence. I outline parts-first, no-priority, and wholes-first theories of per-
durantism.1⁰ Following this, I contend that intra-perdurantist disagree-
ments about temporal phenomenology are not illuminated by appeals to
metaphysical priority. Finally, I discuss some issues regarding relativity
that might be of more significance here.
3.3 priority perdurantism
One option is the view that temporal parts are more fundamental than
spacetime worms. We could call this parts-first perdurantism. For exam-
ple, the temporal parts of a chair are more fundamental than the space-
time worm that they compose.
At first glance, any alternative direction of mereological dependence
may sound nonsensical. Rejecting parts-first perdurantism might sound
somewhat counterintuitive, since perdurantism is typically outlined as
7 See (Fine, 2012), (Rosen, 2010), and (Schaffer, 2009b) for some examples.
8 For example, one might cash things out in terms of a family of ontological dependence
relations or essence dependence instead of grounding (Tahko and Lowe, 2020).
9 In a similar way, we can see how taking proper parthood or fusion as primitive might
provide some weak motivation for priority.
10 I use this terminology instead of ‘stages-first’ and ‘worms-first’ in order to avoid confus-
ing these views with the stage theory and the worm theory, which are related but distinct
positions.
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the view that objects persist by having temporal parts. This may seem
to suggest that temporal parts are metaphysically prior to their fusions.
However, the notion that objects must have temporal parts is not a defi-
nition. Rather, it’s a useful way to express the claim that: necessarily, some
object persists through some interval of time t iff there are parts of that
object (call them ‘temporal parts’) at each time in t. This is perfectly com-
patible with various theses about metaphysical priority, including wholes-
first perdurantism.
We have a necessary biconditional: An object perdures through T iff
it has a distinct part occupying each timeslice of T . But then we might
wonder: What way, if any, does priority run?
But there are good reasons to consider parts-first perdurantism to be
the default perdurantist view. It is generally taken for granted that tem-
poral parts are more fundamental than spacetime worms.11 This seems
like a view that has been implicitly endorsed by many perdurantists, de-
spite the fact that it has rarely been explicitly defended. One exception
would be Ryan Wasserman, who argues that the explanatory value of per-
durantism is derived the view that objects depend on their temporal parts
to persist through time (Wasserman, 2016). The perdurantist account of
temporary intrinsics is one where objects have their temporary proper-
ties indirectly and their parts have those properties directly. Perhaps it is
only a short leap from that to the claim that temporal parts are prior to
their fusions, in general. Parts-first perdurantism also seems to reflect the
more general claim that temporal instants or ‘moments’ are prior to tem-
poral intervals. Moments can be built up out of scattered spatial facts and
then we can build an interval out of those moments. This is the standard
instant-based approach of tense logic (Goranko and Rumburg, 2020: §2).
This is in contrast to an approachmore favoured bymany A-theorists: the
intervals-based approach.
What seems to be themainmotivation behind parts-first perdurantism
and parts-first mereology in general is its role in securing the ontological
innocence of mereology. Central to David Lewis’s defence of mereological
universalism is the notion that mereology is innocent (Lewis, 1991: 81-
7). Committing ourselves to the existence of plenitudinous fusions is not
costly because wholes are ‘nothing over and above’ their parts. The view
that wholes are exhaustively grounded in their parts is a useful way to
secure mereological innocence.
This kind of neat explanation is not readily available to wholes-first per-
durantists, who seem to face many additional pressures to reject mereo-
logical universalism. However, one might think that the wholes-first per-
durantist could adopt a view where parts are ‘nothing under and below’
11 See (Lewis, 1986), (Sider, 2001a), and (Hawley, 2001) for examples.
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theirwholeswhich securesmereological innocence. If we take somemere-
ological universalist model as given, then we could accept the doctrine of
arbitrary undetached parts to entail the existence of many arbitrary parts.
We might then justify that doctrine on the basis that parts are merely
wholes divided. On this wholes-first view, the doctrine of arbitrary unde-
tached parts wouldmotivate innocence rather than the other way around.
I am not so concerned with whether this explanation works as I am with
the many additional reasons why mereological universalism is a bad fit
for wholes-first perdurantism, which I discuss later on.
The view that all parts are prior to their wholes is fairly popular, with
Aaron Cotnoir even claiming that it is part of the ‘default view’ of the
world (Cotnoir, 2013). One might think that there is no uniquely perdu-
rantist path to parts-first pedurantism, but that it simply falls from the
priority of parts simpliciter. Parts-first perdurantism fits nicely what I call
the ‘standard perdurantist package’ which comes along with mereologi-
cal universalism and a B-theory of time.Most perdurantists endorse these
views and it’s fairly easy to see why.12 Mereological universalism plays an
important role in standard perdurantist semantics and in dealing with
paradoxes of coincidence, since it gives us many linguistic candidates to
work with. The B-theory provides a natural motivation for perdurantism,
which gives us temporal parts alongside spatial parts. If the B-theory of
time is true, then we need a theory of persistence which does not appeal
to a metaphysically privileged present.
Another thought might be that this seems to be a common view be-
cause most theories of mereology begin by taking parthood or proper
parthood as basic and then defining other mereological relations such as
fusion in terms of them (Parsons, 2014). However, this sort of claim is
about conceptual priority. What we take as primitive in our conceptual
schemata might simply be things that we understand and are familiar
with, rather than more metaphysically fundamental things.
Parts-first perdurantism retains compatibility with different kinds of
perdurantist semantics and other modified forms of perdurantism. Parts-
first perdurantism is compatible with the stage theory, which is the view
that the ordinary objects we discuss are temporal stages. Since parts-first
perdurantists think that temporal parts are prior to spacetime worms,
it fits quite naturally with the stage theory. However, parts-first perdu-
rantism is also perfectly compatible with the worm theory. Parts-first
perdurantists are still committed to the existence of spacetime worms.
There is no reason why the priority of temporal parts over the perdurant
wholes they compose ought to rule out the worm theory. Consider the
12 (Sider, 2001a) and (Hawley, 2001) are influential examples of contemporary perduran-
tists who are like this.
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‘standard’ parts-first perdurantist worm theory: parts are prior to wholes,
but natural language designators refer to the derivative wholes. The de-
bate between the stage theory and the worm theory concerns natural lan-
guage, not ontology. The additional claim that natural language designa-
tors must latch on to more fundamental entities is not entailed by any
form of perdurantism.13 However, one could also adopt a deflationary
form of parts-first perdurantismwhere spacetime worms are not counted
in the domain of unrestricted quantifiers.This sort of approachwould put
significant pressure on its adherents to adopt the stage theory.
We could also consider an extreme form of parts-first perdurantism,
which we might call parts-only perdurantism.1⁴ On this view, there are
no fusions of temporal parts. There are only temporal parts.1⁵ This view
is more restrictive than regular parts-first perdurantism, since it entails
a nihilist form of the stage theory. Those who endorse the nihilist stage
theory or pixelism are parts-only perdurantists.1⁶
Another optionwould be the inverse one: the view that perdurantwholes
are more fundamental than temporal parts, or wholes-first perdurantism.
We can formulate this view in a few different ways. Onemight be awholes-
first perdurantist and still commit to the claim that objectsmetaphysically
depend on their temporal parts to persist through time. Even these per-
durantists rely on temporal parts to do most of the heavy lifting in their
accounts of persistence. Following Valerio Buonomo, we can distinguish
between persistence dependence and existential dependence:
pers i stence dependence : x depends for its persistence on y.1⁷
ex i stential dependence : xdepends for its existence (simpliciter)
on y (Buonomo, 2018: 74).
Perdurantists that include temporal parts and spacetimeworms in their
ontology generally seem to accept the claim that spacetime worms per-
sist in virtue of having temporal parts. Parts-first, wholes-first, and non-
priority perdurantists disagree on the issue of existential dependence. Parts-
first perdurantists hold that spacetime worms ontologically depend on
13 Thankfully so, as it would lead to deeply revisionary judgements about ordinary lan-
guage use.
14 This is technically a form of no-priority perdurantism. There is no relation of priority
between temporal parts and their fusions, since the fusions do not exist.
15 Names like ‘temporal parts’ and ‘temporal stages’ are unfortunately somewhat mislead-
ing, since they aren’t parts or stages of any whole.
16 Fabio Patrone (2020) is one example. Ted Sider, who has previously defended stage-
theoretic perdurantism and mereological nihilism, albeit separately, may be another ex-
ample (Sider, 2001a; 2013).
17 If ordinary objects persist essentially, then we could treat persistence dependence as a
kind of essence dependence.
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their temporal parts. Wholes-first perdurantists believe the inverse: that
temporal parts exist in virtue of spacetime worms. Non-priority perdu-
rantists deny that there is any existential dependence between temporal
parts and spacetimeworms. Just asmereologists who take parthood as ba-
sic might find parts-first perdurantism appealing, those who take fusion
as basic instead might find wholes-first perdurantism appealing.1⁸
Onemight suggest that StorrsMcCall (1994) argues for a formofwholes-
first perdurantism where temporal parts are abstractions derived from
four-dimensional objects. He takes four-dimensional objects as basic and
suggests that they have a natural shape corresponding to sortal predicates.
Quite clearly, McCall’s view differs from the mereological universalist ap-
proach taken by most other perdurantists. McCall considers temporal
parts to be abstractions ‘in the way that the earth’s equator and merid-
ian lines are abstractions’ (McCall, 1994: 211).
This reveals a tension between the mereological picture of perduran-
tism and the locative picture. For the former, a parts-first ontology seems
like the best fit. For the latter, the claim that objects persist by having tem-
poral parts is coupled with the view that objects are exactly located at a
four-dimensional region. Those who take the latter claim more seriously
than the former might be tempted by this kind of wholes-first view.
However, are serious issues with taking McCall’s view to be a form of
perdurantism. Kristie Miller (2006) points out that McCall’s view that
temporal parts are merely a conceptually convenient way of dividing up
entities is a form of anti-realism about temporal parts.1⁹ If temporal parts
are like meridian lines, then they are nothing like the concrete property-
bearing entities that perdurantists commit themselves to. Rather than see-
ing McCall as a wholes-first perdurantist, I suggest that it makes more
sense to see him as a transdurantist. Transdurantists are like perduran-
tists in that they believe ordinary objects extend through spacetime, but
like endurantists in that they do not endorse the doctrine of temporal
parts (Baron and Miller, 2019: 180).
If endurantism is defined as a rejection of the doctrine of temporal
parts, then transdurantists simply are endurantists. Since wholes-first per-
durantism is a form of perdurantism, it is absolutely committed to the ex-
istence of temporal parts. In contrast, parts-only perdurantism is still a
form of perdurantism.
But we can consider a wholes-first view where objects do not perdure
in virtue of their temporal parts. Suppose that we endorse perdurantism
18 Both (Fine, 2010) and (Kleinschmidt, 2019) take fusion as basic instead of parthood.
19 We could adopt a kind of plenituduous or idealist viewwhere we think that if there exists
some conceptual mechanism for dividing an object O into ‘parts’, then there exist some
parts of O corresponding to that division. Such an option is not available to McCall,
since it clearly conflicts with his deflationary approach.
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for locative reasons. We think that objects have a single four-dimensional
location and that the fundamental properties are distributional properties
of regions.On this view, objects perdure in virtueof being four-dimensional.
They still have temporal parts, but this is just an additional consequence
of having a four-dimensional location. If objects just had many different
three-dimensional locations, then they would not have temporal parts
and they would not perdure. This fits with the earlier necessary bicondi-
tional: on this view, an object perdures through T iff it has a distinct part
occupying each timeslice of T . We can make sense of this kind of view by
considering Antony Eagle’s definition of an S-region:
[An S-region is] a maximal temporally unextended subregion of a lo-
cation [...] That captures precisely the intuitive concept of an instanta-
neous spatial location: namely, it is the region which is the overlap (in-
tersection) of a temporally extended location with a particular time [...]
It follows immediately from this that, if an object has just one location, it
has just one S-region at a time, because intersection is a function (Eagle,
2010: 67-8).
In Eagle’s view, S-regions are derived from locations. If we then define a
temporal part as the occupant of an S-region, then we get temporal parts
from the level-neutral principle that every filled region is exactly occupied
by something.
If we think that only views where temporal parts need to play a special
role in explaining persistence are perdurantist, then this kind of wholes-
first perdurantism is not perdurantist. Perhaps endurantism is simply the
denial of the view that things persist in virtue of their temporal parts and
it doesn’t entail the denial of temporal parts in general. But I don’t think
that revising our taxonomy in this way is a principled thing to do. Perdu-
rantism would be rendered an incredibly specific view whereas enduran-
tism would encompass a variety of very different views. One could be an
endurantist and endorse a view which includes temporal parts alongside
a very perdurantist-friendly locative account or a completely different
view where temporal parts do not exist and objects have multiple three-
dimensional locations, which seems very odd.
A more serious worry for this kind of view is that it enjoys no serious
advantage over transdurantism. If temporal parts play no special explana-
tory role and what matters is that objects have a unique four-dimensional
location, then why have temporal parts in the first place? We have an an-
swer to the problem of change invoking distributional properties of re-
gions, so it seems that temporal parts don’t play any meaningful role here.
Temporal parts are already controversial and there’s hardly any reason to
keep them if they aren’t needed. If this kind of wholes-first ‘perdurantist’
chooses to become a transdurantist, then they can make their view more
palatable to those who are hostile to any notion of temporal parts while
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not sacrificing any explanatory power. So this view ought to collapse into
transdurantism. As such, I believe that any wholes-first perdurantist is
best off endorsing a view where objects persist in virtue of their tempo-
ral parts but are nonetheless more fundamental than them in existential
terms.
Wholes-first perdurantism is a difficult position to formulate. This is
for several reasons. Firstly, a universal theory of wholes-first perduran-
tism does not play well with mereological universalism. Most perduran-
tists endorsemereological universalismandunrestrictedmereological com-
position. One clear worry here is that wholes-first perdurantism and un-
restricted composition leads to a metaphysics where there are many per-
durant wholesmore fundamental than their temporal parts. Consider the
infamous ‘trout-turkey’, a mereological fusion of a trout and a turkey. In
this case, let us assume we’re fusing one of the trout’s temporal parts and
one of the turkey’s temporal parts. Under wholes-first perdurantism, the
trout-turkey turns out to be more fundamental than its parts. This seems
deeply counter-intuitive. If all wholes are more fundamental than their
parts, then we’re left with a metaphysics with a bizarre chain of priority.
Thiswould also seem to commit thewholes-first perdurantist to amore
costly version of priority monism. If perduring sums aremore fundamen-
tal than their parts, then the Spinozan whole (the universe) must also be
more fundamental than its parts. This is a more costly view than priority
monism because most versions of priority monism do not commit them-
selves to the priority of all fusions over their parts, just the priority of the
Spinozan whole over its parts (Schaffer, 2010a). If wholes-first perduran-
tists want to avoid these issues, then they need to reject unrestricted com-
position or endorse a weaker version of wholes-first perdurantism that
only applies to some spacetime worms under specific conditions.
Buonomo (2018) takes the both paths, endorsing wholes-first perdu-
rantism in regards to persons while remaining neutral as to the direction
of priority for other persisting objects. He also endorses a distinction be-
tween mere sums and structured wholes where the latter are more fun-
damental than their temporal parts. This is a kind of restricted composi-
tion view, since not all things have a fusion which is a structured whole.
Buonomo believes that this provides his version of wholes-first perdu-
rantism with an advantage over parts-first and no-priority perdurantism
(Buonomo, 2018). I disagree. Requiring additional metaphysical assump-
tions in order to render wholes-first perdurantism viable seems like more
of a disadvantage than anything else, especially since other perdurantists
could also choose to endorse a distinction between mere sums and struc-
tured wholes. Furthermore, structured wholes-first perdurantism seems
to be committed to an unattractive semantics of ordinary counting. They
are pressured to adopt a worm-theoretic semantics, but their commit-
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ment to the priority of structured wholes may also prevent them from
adopting the kind of covert quantifier domain restriction-sensitive worm
theory that I outline in Counting for Worm Theorists. If ordinary objects
are structured wholes and not the plenitudinous sums of unrestricted
composition, then it may be costly to also endorse contextually maximal
wholes to explain ordinary counting sentences.
I think there are better ways to formulate a version of wholes-first per-
durantism. One need not endorse a distinction between mere sums and
structured wholes to think that only some wholes are prior to their parts.
Priority monism is one example of a wholes-first metaphysics which is
radically inegalitarian about which wholes are fundamental. They believe
that the cosmos itself is the only fundamental object. Schaffer (2009a)
accepts both priority monism and perdurantism. He is also a supersub-
stantivalist, whichmeans that he believes that spacetime is a fundamental
substance and that material objects are identical to the spacetime regions
they occupy.2⁰ Perdurantists who are also priority monists might have
good reason to be wholes-first perdurantists.
Some of the motivations for priority monism and wholes-first perdu-
rantism are shared. For example, both priority monism and wholes-first
perdurantism are able to account for the possibility of gunk in the same
way. Gunk is matter which does not bottom out into indivisible simples,
it is atomless (Schaffer, 2009a). Every part of a gunky object has further
proper parts. If gunk ismetaphysically possible, thenmetaphysicians need
to account for it. With parts-first views, we end up with an endless chain
of metaphysical dependence. Things get more and more basic as you di-
vide them into further parts. On this view, nothing would ultimately turn
out to be basic at gunky worlds. If nothing is basic, then there is no ulti-
mate ground. Without an ultimate ground, then things look bad for any
irreflexive notion of metaphysical priority. Of course, the parts-first per-
durantist could respond by claiming that their theory need not be true at
all worlds. If the actual world is not gunky, then parts-first perdurantism
isn’t under too much of a threat. In contrast, wholes-first perdurantists
have no problem accounting for the possibility of gunk. If we think that
we need our explanations to terminate somewhere, then it seems natural
to think that the endlessly divisible parts of gunky objects metaphysically
depend on their wholes.21
20 This is in contrast to both dualistic substantivalism (the view that both objects and space-
time regions are two different kinds of fundamental entities) and relationalism (the view
that spacetime is merely derivative).
21 The other option for the parts-first perdurantist is to deny that we need an ultimate
ground. Perhaps our explanations don’t terminate and we do have an endless chain of
metaphysical dependence after all.
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While wholes-first perdurantism might be attractive to perdurantists
who endorse priority monism, they are not forced to adopt it. One might
endorse a view where the cosmos is prior to its parts and most temporal
parts are prior to their wholes.This would turn out to be a view where the
cosmos is the only spacetime worm prior to its parts.
3.4 perdurantism without priority
Onemight instead be a no-priority perdurantist and reject any relation of
priority between temporal parts and spacetime worms. On this view, tem-
poral parts and their fusions are not metaphysically dependent on each
other for their existence. Ordinary objects still persist in virtue of having
temporal parts, but they are not any more or less basic in the existential
sense. Mark Heller (1990) is a no-priority perdurantist. For him, ‘tem-
poral parts and the wholes that they compose are ontologically on a par’
(Heller, 1990: 22).
Like parts-first perdurantism, no-priority perdurantism is compatible
with a range of different perdurantist views. No-priority perdurantism is
compatible with the worm theory and the stage theory. It is not compat-
ible with pixelism and unlike parts-first perdurantism, it is not compati-
ble with deflationary versions of the stage theory which treat spacetime
worms as dispensable derivative entities.
While a parts-first view is often assumed to be the default view, one
might note that classical mereology is neutral on the issue. If the theory of
mereology is a topic-neutral application of first-order logic with identity,
then perhaps we should avoid baking our metaphysics into our mereol-
ogy. One might reply that we could still endorse a direction of mereologi-
cal priority without seeking it in the first-order language, or reject the as-
sertion that mereology is topic-neutral. While mereological priority may
be controversial, it is still largely regarded as the default view.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that metaphysical priority is also ac-
cepted in set theory. The inclusion relation between members and classes
is considered onewhere themembers are ontologically prior to their class-
es (Lewis, 1991). Again, this is not part of set theory proper. We need not
decide to take the iterative conception of set to capture dependence. But
the set-theoretic parallel is constructive, since Boolos uses the iterative
conception of set to motivate the content of set-theoretic axioms (Boo-
los, 1989).22 Likewise, Lewis seems to use a parts-first picture to moti-
22 Of course, set theory is explicitly generative in a way that parthood is not. The singleton
a is very different from the set a, but the degenerate fusion of the parts b is just b again.
So one might argue that the extremely thin way in which fusions are distinct from the
parts they fuse is a reason for treating them as ontologically on par. This is not the case,
however, for proper parts.
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vate mereological universalism. If a fusion is ‘nothing over and above’ its
parts, then they are no novel addition to reality. We can accept mereologi-
cal universalism without cost if we already accept a parts-first mereology.
However, if wholes are substantive entities not reductively grounded in
their parts, then it’s harder to see how we get them for free in the way that
Lewis envisages.
Strict composition as identity is another way to try to account for the
innocence of mereology. Composition as identity is the view that mere-
ological composition is identity. The whole is identical to the sum of its
parts. Mereological sums are not anything above their parts because they
just are the same thing. Composition as identity gives us a simple and illu-
minating explanation of these two features of mereology without needing
irreflexive priority.
Andrew M. Bailey (2011) has argued that irreflexive priority theories
are incompatible with strict composition as identity. Hence, those who
endorse strict composition as identity might have an additional reason to
reject parts-first and wholes-first views in favour of no-priority perduran-
tism. I note that Bailey’s argument only challenges strict forms of compo-
sition as identity. There are also weak forms of composition as identity
where composition is like identity but is not strict identity in the sense of
‘=’. Let’s state Bailey’s argument against parts-first mereology as applied
to priority perdurantism:23
(1) Danny is a spacetime worm composed of his temporal parts t1,
t2, and t3. (Assumption)
(2) Danny is identical to his temporal parts t1, t2, and t3. (1, Compo-
sition as Identity)
(3) The temporal parts t1 t2, and t3 are ontologically prior to Danny.
(1, Parts-First Perdurantism)
(4) Danny is not identical to his temporal parts t1 t2, and t3. (3, Ir-
reflexivity of Priority)
(5) Danny is identical and not identical to his temporal parts t1 t2,
and t3. (2, 4)
While I have stated this argument in reference to parts-first perduran-
tism, the same result applies to wholes-first perdurantism. Rejecting the
irreflexivity of priority is not an option, as (Bailey, 2011: 172) points out
that this would entail that all mereological sums are prior to themselves.
We could avoid this argument by rejecting the strict version of composi-
tion as identity and instead adopting a weaker view such as weak com-
23 The original argument is stated purely in terms of classical mereology, but the form of
the argument remains the same here.
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position as identity. This is the view that composition is merely analo-
gous to identity in some way. Rejecting composition as identity may not
be a problem, especially since many philosophers already do so.2⁴ Be-
sides, mereological priority can also account the intimacy and innocence
of mereology. Maybe the parts are prior to the wholes in a way that en-
sures the properties of the wholes flow from the collective properties of
the parts. Parthood is ontologically innocent because the whole is derived
from its parts. If parts-first and wholes-first theorists need to reject com-
position as identity, then so much the worse for composition as identity.
Alternatively, we could follow Roberto Loss (2016) in arguing that pri-
ority is actually compatible with composition as identity. Loss distinguish-
es between collected pluralities of parts and scattered pluralities of parts
(Loss, 2016). We can think of a collected plurality of temporal parts as
something like ‘the collected tp plurality’ as a single entity and which fea-
ture in propositions like ‘the collected tp plurality exists’.2⁵ In contrast,
scattered pluralities of parts take their parts individually like ‘t1, t2, and
t3’ and which feature in propositions like ‘t1 exists, t2 exists, t3 exists’.
OnLoss’s view, composition as identity is secured becausemereological
wholes are identical to their parts taken as a collected plurality of facts.
The fact that Danny exists is identical to the fact that In contrast, priority
obtains from the fact that the parts, taken as a scattered plurality, are prior
to their fusion. We can sketch this out in terms of priority perdurantism
as follows:
(6) Danny is a spacetime worm composed of his temporal parts t1,
t2, and t3. (Assumption)
(7) The scattered plurality of temporal parts t1 t2, and t3 are ontolog-
ically prior to Danny. (1, Parts-First Perdurantism)
(8) The fact that Danny exists and the fact that the collected plurality
of his temporal parts exist is the same fact. (1, Composition as
Identity)
(9) Danny is not identical to the scattered plurality of his temporal
parts t1 t2, and t3. (2, Irreflexivity of Priority)
However, one might respond by claiming that this still leads to a con-
tradiction. If I am not identical to the scattered plurality of my temporal
parts, then surely I cannot also be identical to the collected plurality ofmy
temporal parts. If this is true, then we are back to square one. Fortunately,
Loss (2016: 492) suggests that this inference relies on a principle that we
can avoid endorsing. He contends that this inference relies on the idea
24 Including perdurantists like (Lewis, 1991) and (Sider, 2007).
25 Where ‘tp’ denotes ‘temporal parts’.
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that if x is identical to some collected plurality (the ys), then the propo-
sition ‘x exists’ is identical to the scattered plurality (of propositions) ‘y1
exists, y2 exists, etc.’. From this principle and (9), one can make the valid
inference that I am not identical to the collected plurality of my temporal
parts, which contradicts (8). Loss suggests that that this principle is de-
rived from composition as identity and an additional, similar principle.
This second principle is that if x is identical to the ys, then the proposi-
tion ‘x exists’ is merely the fusion of the propositions ‘y1 exists’, ‘y2 exists’
etc. It is true that these propositions will compose a whole which, un-
der unrestricted composition and composition as identity, they will be
identical. However, Loss argues that we need not take the fusion of these
propositions to be the proposition ‘x exists’ (Loss, 2016: 493). He suggests
that there are plausible cases where someone believes the proposition ‘x
exists’ without believing every individual proposition ‘y1 exists’, ‘y2 exists’
etc. For example, one might believe that the moon exists but have no be-
lief about the existence of some of the moon’s parts. So strict composition
as identity and mereological priority are compatible.2⁶
In hindsight, objections like Bailey’s were always going to come up
when considering one-many identity in the setting of strict composition
as identity. In one-one identity, if Fa and ¬Fb , then a 6= b. But if A =
b, c, d and F is the predicate ‘are many’, then a isn’t many while b, c, d are.
3.5 phenomenology
One significant way in which different kinds of perdurantism tend to vary
is in their respective accounts of phenomenology. Heller (1990) adopts
no-priority perdurantism in response to a phenomenological argument
against perdurantism. Buonomo (2018) adoptswholes-first perdurantism
in response to the same argument. In this section, I investigate the claim
that different views on perdurantism andmereological priority reflect dis-
agreements about the proper subjects of ordinary experience. This may
be somewhat confusing because there is nothing inherent in this discus-
sion of phenomenology that seems to directly entail that temporal parts
or spacetime worms are more fundamental in an ontological sense. How-
ever, I frame things in this way because some parts-first, no-priority, and
wholes-first perdurantists seem to adopt these positions in line with their
views on mereological priority, rather than without reference to them.
However, I argue that different views about priority ultimately fail to be
probative here.
26 One might still object that these collected pluralities are just fusions in disguise. I don’t
discuss this issue, but Loss (2016) offers an interesting argument in response suggesting
that we cannot treat fusions as identical to collected pluralities.
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Roderick Chisholm argues that perdurantists cannot account for how
human consciousness displays a kind of unity over time (Chisholm, 1971).
Whenwe hear an utterance of ‘the sky is blue’, we are experiencing the sen-
tence in full. We might have this more sophisticated experience in virtue
of multiple sub-experiences, such as hearing ‘the’, ‘sky’, ‘is’, ‘blue’ in suc-
cession.2⁷ Chisholm thinks that in order for us to experience ‘the sky is
blue’, the entity having each part of that experience must be the self-same
thing. The entity hearing ‘the’ must be the same as the entity hearing ‘sky’
in order for them to experience an utterance of ‘the sky’. The thought here
is that whenever we have an experience of some utterance like ‘the sky
is blue’, we also have the second-order experience of ‘the’ and ‘sky’ being
parts of the same experience. But under a perdurantist ontology that com-
mits us to multiple entities experiencing each respective sub-experience,
we have this second-order experience without any such genuine unity.
There are a fewways to respond toChisholm.Heller (1990) responds by
arguing that this argument only applies to parts-first perdurantism.Heller
contends that parts-first perdurantism renders spacetime worms a ‘mere
convention’ (Heller, 1990: 22). He thinks that if we take temporal parts as
basic entities that compose perduringwholes, thenwe are forced to appeal
to conventions as the thing which unite temporal parts. This seems like
an odd claim to attribute to parts-first theorists. On my account, we can
straightforwardly accept that spacetime worms aren’t mere conventions
and that some non-conventional things, such as parts, can ground other
non-conventional things.
The ‘conventionalism’ of standard perdurantism is a kind of linguistic
conventionalism, rather than a kind of conventionalism about existence.
Consider the standard perdurantist response to paradoxes of coincidence
and fission. In the case of the Ship of Theseus, a ship has a plank replaced
after it is damaged (Sider, 2001a). Ships can survive the loss and replace-
ment of a single plank. But suppose that each individual plank is slowly
replaced over time.The old planks are kept in a warehouse and assembled
into a new ship. Which ship is the same ship as the ‘real’ Ship of Theseus?
There are clearly two salient spacetime worms which can serve as can-
didates: the ‘replacement’ worm and the ‘old planks’ worm. Which one
gets to be called the Ship of Theseus is an issue of convention. Perhaps
our concept of ‘the Ship of Theseus’ applies to the entity sailing back and
forth from Crete to the Greek mainland or perhaps it is a convention that
ships must retain their planks. Which entity is the ‘real’ Ship of Theseus
is determined by linguistic convention. But both spacetime worms exist
in the perdurantist’s ontology, regardless of which one turns out to be the
‘real’ Ship of Theseus.
27 We could go even more fine-grained and talk about individual syllables.
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Heller seems to think that parts-first perdurantism renders spacetime
worms a mere convention because Chisholm derives his definition of
temporal parts from the work of the 18th Century theologian Jonathan
Edwards. Edwardsian temporal parts are instantaneous entities created
ex nihilo by God (Helm, 1979). The Edwardsian view is a form of parts-
first perdurantism where spacetime worms persist as a matter of (divine)
convention. On Chisholm’s conception of temporal parts, the religious
aspects are unimportant. What matters for the view that Chisholm and
Heller are discussing is that:
(1) Temporal parts are created ex nihilo.
(2) Temporal parts are more ontologically basic than spacetime wor-
ms.
(3) The existence of spacetime worms is merely a matter of conven-
tion.
Heller seems to take it that (1) and (2) imply (3). In rejecting the view
that temporal parts come into existence ex nihilo and that they are more
basic than their fusions, he argues that he can avoid Chisholm’s objection.
The idea of temporal parts as entities created ex nihilo is significant
here. Heller notes that this allows for degenerate cases where people ex-
perience a diachronic unity of consciousness. Let’s consider the example
of experiencing an utterance of ‘evergreen’. We can divide this experience
into two sub-experiences, the experience of hearing ‘ever’ and the expe-
rience of hearing ‘green’. The experience of hearing ‘green’ immediately
after hearing ‘ever’ is very different from the experience of hearing ‘green’
without this lead-in. We can call the first case an experience of ‘green-1’
and the second an experience of ‘green-2.’ The reason why these experi-
ences are different is precisely because green-1 involves the retention of a
specific earlier experience (hearing ‘ever’), whereas green-2 does not.
Itmight be tempting to think of retaining the earlier experience of hear-
ing ‘ever’ as amemory. However, theremight degenerate cases where false
memories can induce a kind of illusory unity.2⁸ Consider a case where
someone experiences a green-1 experience without ever having heard an
utterance of ‘ever’. In this case, a person is created ex nihilo by God, is
given the false memory of hearing ‘ever’, and then immediately hears an
utterance of ‘green’. This person’s green-1 experience includes something
which seems to them to be memory traces of hearing ‘ever’, even though
they never actually had the experience of hearing ‘ever’. Nonetheless, they
would still have something which seems like the second-order experience
of a unity of consciousness. This experience of a ‘unity’ of consciousness
28 There are more general issues with taking the retention required for diachronic unity to
be memory. See (Brook and Raymont, 2017: §5).
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does not require a single object to have both the ‘ever’ and ‘green’ experi-
ence, but this seems like a case where there is no such genuine unity.
In ordinary scenarios, we get into a green-1 experience through a ca-
sual relationship between our brain states at different times.We hear ‘ever’
at t1 and ‘green’ at t2. The state of my brain at t2 is affected by the state of
my brain at t1. What matters is not that the entity experiencing green-1 is
identical to the entity that initially heard ‘ever’, but that the entity experi-
encing green-1 is in the right causal relationship to experience a genuine
unity of consciousness. One could easily replace this talk of ‘my brain at t1’
and ‘my brain at t2’ with talk of my brain’s temporal parts. On this view,
not all fusions are created equal. There is a genuine causal connection
between my brain’s temporal parts, whereas there is a far weaker causal
connection between, say, my brain’s temporal parts and yours. As Heller
notes, perdurantists can give a genuine explanation of how an individual
has a unity of consciousness that fares no worse than non-perdurantist
explanations. Chisholm’s argument only seems to succeed if all of our
mental states must be fully intrinsic. It seems to presuppose that mental
contents are internal, so that intrinsic duplicates must necessarily be in
the same mental states. Such a strong assumption would need to be jus-
tified before it could present a serious objection to perdurantism. Even
then, an internalist perdurantist could resist Chisholm’s argument. They
could claim that the unity of consciousness isn’t merely about our men-
tal states, but our mental states being caused in the right, non-degenerate
way.
I reject Heller’s claim that Chisholm’s argument still succeeds against
the parts-first perdurantist. Heller’s objection to parts-first perdurantism
is misguided. What he really seems to be objecting to is the Edwardsian
conception of temporal parts andnot parts-first perdurantism itself. Parts-
first perdurantism does not entail that temporal parts are created ex ni-
hilo, nor does it entail that ordinary objects are purely conventional. A
parts-first perdurantist can help themselves to the same kind of expla-
nation that Heller offers. So I don’t think that perdurantists of any kind,
aside from the Edwardsians, face any serious threat from Chisholm’s ar-
gument. This also undercuts Buonomo’s motivation for wholes-first per-
durantism, which he argues is preferable because of its compatibility with
the diachronic unity of consciousness (Buonomo, 2018).
Another phenomenological objection may concern the fact that all ex-
periences take time. It might be fine to divide temporally extended expe-
riences into smaller chunks, but can we really divide them into temporal
instants? Presumably desiring, experiencing, and thinking all take more
than an instant to obtain. So instantaneous person-stages cannot be the
subjects of first-person experience.
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There are two good replies to this objection.The first is to point out that
perdurantism does not require a commitment to the view that all tem-
poral parts are instantaneous. We could have extended temporal parts,
which are extended in time for a few seconds, or at least longer than a sin-
gle instant. Alternatively, we could use the same kind of reply that Heller
offers against Chisholm to deal with this objection too. The property of
having a temporally extended experience could be a relational one. Ei-
ther way, parts-first and no-priority perdurantists can avoid this objec-
tion with relative ease.
The phenomenology of action alsomotivates this tension between part
and whole. People tend to have a special concern for their future, they de-
liberate and act for their future selves. I am willing to spend time writing
my thesis in the present, instead of doing other things, because I believe
that this will benefit me in the future. Some suggest that this only makes
sense if our future-regarding thoughts and actions are being had by the
self-same person. If the subject of my experience is a temporal part be-
cause my experience is grounded in my temporal parts, then we are mak-
ing sacrifices for our distinct temporal parts in the future. In contrast,
Buonomo’s wholes-first pedurantism has an easier time accounting for
this intuition.
These phenomenological considerations cut both ways, however. Par-
sons offers what he calls a phenomenological argument for the stage the-
ory (Parsons, 2015).2⁹ He argues that the stage theory offers the best ac-
count of how and why our conscious experience is of the present. What
I am experiencing, right now, is not my entire life. I am experiencing a
single time, whether it’s an instant or a time with a reasonably short du-
ration. The real locus of temporal experience is the person-stage, not the
spacetime worm.
Parsons goes one step further: he claims that our phenomenology priv-
ileges the present to such an extent that things in the present and the near
past seem more real to us than things in the distant past and future. The
stage theorist has an easy explanation for this: people are person-stages
located at a single time. Things located in your distant past and distant
future don’t seem as real to you because you’re not experiencing them.
You are a short-lived entity experiencing a short moment in the history
of your life.
In contrast, Parsons contends that the worm theorist cannot provide a
satisfactory explanation of why the present and near past are privileged
in our phenomenology. But why? The parts-first worm theorist also has
a fairly simple explanation. You are a temporally-extended entity that
29 Bradford Skow (2011) offers a similar argument, although his differs in that it is a de-
ductive argument, whereas Parsons’s is an abductive one. Skow also provides different
responses to objections.
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changes over time and you experience things in virtue of your temporal
parts. What you experience also changes over time. You experience some
time t1 because you have a temporal part located at t1, then you experi-
ence t2 because you have a temporal part located at t2, and so on. This
doesn’t mean that what you’re experiencing right now is somehow more
‘yours’ than what you experienced yesterday. Our phenomenology might
privilege certain times, but our metaphysics doesn’t.
Parsons considers this objection and offers what he admits is a flat-
footed reply. It simply seems to him that we really are person-stages and
that’s why what we’re experiencing right now seems privileged over tem-
porally distant things. If you reply, ‘No, it really seems to me that I am
a spacetime worm!’, then Parsons admits that there is little he can do
to change your mind. Parsons’s own phenomenological introspection is
hardly a strong point against the worm theory.
One might still contend that the stage theory still wins out in the end
because it provides a simpler account of our temporal phenomenology
and the indexical ‘I’. The thought here might be that on the stage theory,
my present experience is had by me simpliciter whereas it is not on the
worm theory. If I am a spacetime worm, then my present experience is
understood as a relation to a temporal part that has the experience sim-
pliciter.3⁰ This is a fairly standard point in favour of the stage theory. It is,
however, offset by the problems that the stage theory runs into when deal-
ing with properties that require temporal extent (Haslanger, 2003: 334).
For example, I only ‘persist’ because I stand in the right temporal coun-
terpart relation to other stages on the stage theory. Furthermore, I have
previously argued that the stage theory ultimately provides an inferior se-
mantics to the worm theory in Counting for Worm Theorists. As such, I
see no compelling reason to adopt the stage theory over the worm theory.
What I do see inParsons’s argument could be a reason to reject Buonomo’s
version of wholes-first perdurantism. My thinking, experiencing, and de-
siring is being done by my temporal parts. In other words, I experience
the world in virtue of my temporal parts. Perhaps no-priority perduran-
tism is amenable to this view, particularly if it turns out that this debate
has little to bear on the broader question of whether to take temporal
parts or spacetime worms as basic. Buonomo’s view is in trouble, how-
ever. In his version of wholes-first perdurantism, spacetime worms are
the real site of experience, thought, and action (Buonomo, 2018: 108).
Yet, as Parsons’s argument shows, our first-person experience seems to
be in virtue of our temporal parts. Here the wholes-first perdurantist has
a few options. The first would be to argue that our phenomenology is illu-
30 Skow (2011) finds this claim difficult to believe. He suggests that we can only be confi-
dent that our experiences are had simpliciter by anything if we are confident that they
are had by us. I don’t see any strong reason to motivate this worry.
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sory. Parsons considers this option but ultimately dismisses it, noting that
it seems to posit a plenitude of similar illusions at each moment we exist
where one of the illusions (the one located in the specious present) seems
to be the most vivid (Parsons, 2015). Another option would be to reject
Parsons’s account of our phenomenology. Perhaps he and I are both mis-
taken, and we don’t really have this phenomenology. I don’t find this reply
particularly compelling, at least not without a new argument for rejecting
this account of first-person experience.
Our phenomenology seems to pull us in different directions. It’s not
clear that parts-first, no-priority, or wholes-first perdurantism win out
based on phenomenological concerns alone. They might not actually be
relevant to these debates over phenomenology at all. Firstly, it’s not un-
reasonable to assume that a successful explanation of experience is ulti-
mately going to be a causal, physical one. Our phenomenology may not,
one might think that it probably will not, be explained with grounding.
Especially considering that these debates concern the nature of what and
how we experience more so than they do the grounds of experience.
Secondly, it’s not at all clear that priority tells us anything about what
entity is the subject of ordinary first-person experience. Why should we
think that parts-first perdurantism entails or even implies that temporal
parts are at the centre of our phenomenology? Experience and fundamen-
tality do not run in parallel to each other. We wouldn’t be justified in
claiming that elementary particles are experiencing subjects instead of
human brains because they are more fundamental than them, for exam-
ple. Suppose that, for the sake of argument, phenomenological arguments
successfully demonstrate that the temporal parts of my mental states are
prior to their fusions. Even then, this would still not demonstrate that the
temporal parts of me are prior to my fusion. We would need some ad-
ditional argument or bridge principle to explain how the priority of my
mental state’s temporal parts generalises out to all of my other temporal
parts. It is for these reasons that, unlike Buonomo and Heller, I do not
find priority to be particularly illuminating here. However, there is a dif-
ferent scenario where I do think that perdurantists need to take a stand on
the issue of priority. This is a scenario concerning Minkowski spacetime.
3.6 minkowski spacetime
On the special theory of relativity, ordinary objects are appear to have
different three-dimensional shapes from different (inertial) frames of ref-
erence. Many people, particularly perdurantists, think that there is some-
thing invariant which unifies these many three-dimensional shapes.They
believe that this is a four-dimensional world tube.When we look at an ob-
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ject’s four-dimensional world tube from different frames of reference, we
see itsmany different three-dimensional shapes.These three-dimensional
shapes are perspectival representations of the four-dimensionalworld tube.
This follows from the more basic fact that frames of reference are essen-
tially conventionalways of representing four-dimensionalMinkowski space-
time.
Perdurantists are well-equipped to rise to the demands of special rel-
ativity. They can, following Yuri Balashov, hold that ordinary objects ex-
actly occupy a unique four-dimensional region in spacetime – their world
tube (Balashov, 2010). For each overlapping region between an object’s
four-dimensional world tube and some frame relative time from some
frame of reference, the object has a temporal part that is exactly located
at that region.
Unfortunately, this special relativity-friendly account is not available to
temporal parts-first perdurantists. The reason for this is simple: if times
are sets of simultaneous events, then (instantaneous) temporal parts are
not relativistically invariant and four-dimensional volumes are.31 If tem-
poral parts are not relativistically invariant, then they cannot be more
fundamental than their invariant wholes. Temporal parts cannot be rela-
tivistically invariant because times are not prior to spacetime regions in
Minkowski spacetime.
For an object O’s temporal parts to be prior to O, there would need to
be some metaphysically privileged frame of reference where the achronal
regions occupied by O are all exactly occupied by O’s temporal parts and
not, say, strange hybrids of temporal parts. However, there is no such priv-
ileged frame in Minkowski spacetime.32 As Gibson and Pooley point out:
From the physicist’s perspective, the content of spacetime is as it is.
One can choose to describe this content from the perspective of a partic-
ular inertial frame of reference (i.e., to describe it relative to some stan-
dard of rest and some standard of distant simultaneity that are optimally
adapted to the geometry of spacetime but are otherwise arbitrary). But
one can equally choose to describe the contents of spacetime with re-
spect to some frame that is not so optimally adapted to the geometric
structure of spacetime, or indeed, choose to describe it in some entirely
frame-independent manner. (Gibson and Pooley, 2006: 162)
Hence,O’s temporal parts cannot be prior toO. What is relativistically
invariant, and thus has some chance of being fundamental, is the space-
time region occupied by the whole of O.
31 Davidson (2014) argues against the relativistic invariance of four-dimensional shapes.
Balashov (2014) replies and Calosi (2015) offers an independent argument in support
of invariance.
32 This argument from simultaneity has also been used to argue against the A-theory of
time and presentism (Putnam, 1967).
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Alternatively, we could take time to be a ‘flat’Cauchy surface. A Cauchy
surface is a three-dimensional spacelike region extending throughout the
entirety of space. StevenF. Savitt definesCauchy surfaces as a set of achronal
spacetime points such that every single timelike and lightlike curve with-
out end intersects it exactly once (Savitt, 2000: S571). A Cauchy surface
is ‘flat’ if there exists some frame of reference where all of its constituent
spacetime points are mutually simultaneous (Gilmore, Costa, and Calosi,
2016: 116). On this view, ‘being a time’ is invariant and so too is the no-
tion of being a temporal part. But this view also leaves us with a pleni-
tude of temporal parts, all massively overlapping each other. It’s very dif-
ficult to see how such things jointly ground in an explanatorily useful
way, given the massive redundancy of information on offer. Furthermore,
this ‘flat’ Cauchy surface picture is not an attractive option for standard
B-theoretic perdurantists. The idea that time is a ‘flat’ Cauchy surface is
generally proposed as a way to make special relativity more friendly to
A-theorists, since it allows times to be relativistically invariant (Gilmore,
Costa, and Calosi, 2016).
Another argument by Yuri Balashov (2000; 2010), which purports to
demonstrate an advantage perdurantismhas over endurantism, could also
be modified to be an argument for wholes-first perdurantism:
(1) In a relativistic setting, individual objects have many different
three-dimensional shapes in different reference frames.
(2) (Wholes-first) Perdurantism can show how these different shapes
are related:They aremere perspectival representations of a smooth
four-dimensional volume which ‘stands behind’ them.33
(3) Endurantists (and parts-first perdurantists) are unable to adequately
explain how collections of three-dimensional shapes ‘come to-
gether in a remarkable unity’.
(4) Ergo, (wholes-first) perdurantism offers a superior explanation of
this phenomena. (1, 2, 3)
(5) All other things being equal, the theory that provides the better
explanation is more likely to be true. (Inference to the Best Expla-
nation)
(6) (Wholes-first) Perdurantism is more likely to be true. (4, 5)3⁴
Balashov claims that his version of this argument, which makes no dis-
tinction between parts-first and wholes-first perdurantism, has nothing
to do with grounding or metaphysical dependence. Perdurantists are able
33 The same would apply for transdurantism.
34 The italicised text is added by me and not present in Balashov’s argument. In addition,
my presentation of this argument in premise-conclusion form is borrowed from (Eagle,
2011).
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to explain how a single object appears to have different three-dimensional
shapes in different frames of reference by highlighting how these shapes
are simply different frame dependent slices of a four-dimensional object.
It’s a useful explanation, but not a metaphysical one. He goes as far as
to make it clear that he believes ‘the facts about the occupation of space-
time points by fundamental particles, along with the facts about compo-
sition at-a-time in-a-frame, ground the facts about 3D shapes’ (Balashov,
2000: 213). Nonetheless, I think that there are good reasons to treat this
as a metaphysical argument for wholes-first perdurantism.
Balashovwrites about how four-dimensional objects ‘stand behind’ their
three-dimensional parts, which are just entities “carved out’ from [their
whole]’ (Balashov, 2000; 2010).This seems to imply that Balashov’s expla-
nation is a metaphysical one where four-dimensional wholes are prior to
their three-dimensional parts.
Another reason is that the argument, if non-metaphysical, is a very low
stakes one. Endurantists have a few different avenues for explaining how
different three-dimensional shapes are related to each other and fit into a
four-dimensional volume. The transdurantist can help themselves to the
same kind of explanation that Balashov uses, whereas endurantists that
endorsemulti-location can follow Sider’s strategy of grounding an object’s
four-dimensional path in the location of its constituent fundamental par-
ticles (Sider, 2001a: 83).3⁵ Balashov contends that his explanation is better
than Sider’s at a macroscopic level since he has a fairly simple explanation
that doesn’t rely on various facts about micro-level objects and their lo-
cations. Even so, Balashov’s commitment to the primacy of facts about
fundamental particles and composition means that his ‘macroscopic’ ex-
planation would still bottom out in much the same way as Sider’s does.
If the argument is merely that perdurantists and transdurantists can give
a slightly more convenient macroscopic explanation than multi-location
endurantists, then it does not seem to matter a whole lot whether Bal-
ashov is right or wrong. Perdurantists and transdurantists gain very little,
while multi-location endurantists don’t lose much either.
If, on the other hand, we treat this as an argument for wholes-first per-
durantism, then the stakes aremuch higher.Thewholes-first perdurantist
and the transdurantist have a tidy explanation of why collections of three-
dimensional shapes are unified in four dimensions.The four-dimensional
whole is fundamental and its three-dimensional parts are mere perspecti-
val projections of it. Balashov’s macroscopic explanation would turn out
to be irreducible to facts about fundamental particles occupying point-
sized regions of spacetime. Ultimately, I think that this is the most natu-
35 Gibson and Pooley (2006) and Miller (2004) also develop an endurantist account in
response to Balashov.
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ral way to make sense of a four-dimensional entity ‘standing behind’ its
parts. And, if the argument succeeds, then endurantists and parts-first
perdurantists have an inferior metaphysical explanation.
Unfortunately for wholes-first perdurantists, I don’t think the argu-
ment is successful. Parts-first perdurantists have a principled way to ex-
plain the phenomenon at hand. They can explain the four-dimensional
path of an object in terms of the trajectories of their constituent particles.
Then, we can associate that four-dimensional path with a single entity.
This gives parts-first perdurantists access to the same kind of explanation
that Balashov offers: many different-looking three-dimensional shapes
are neatly related because they are just the shapes of a four-dimensional
volume occupied by a single object.3⁶
But what about the initial argument from simultaneity against the pri-
ority of temporal parts? I suggest that the parts-first perdurantist follow
Gibson and Pooley (2006) in thinking in terms of spatiotemporal parts in
a relativistic setting.The distinction between spatial and temporal parts is
valuable in ordinary metaphysics, but not in relativity theory. Space and
time are unified, so what looks like temporal change from one perspec-
tive looks like spatial variation from a different one (Hawley, 2009: 512).
Something which is a temporal part from one frame of referecne is not
from another and the same goes for spatial parts. On this picture, four-
dimensional objects are composed of many point-sized spatiotemporal
parts for each point-sized subregion of the whole region that they occupy.
Spatiotemporal parts are prior to spatiotemporal wholes for the same sort
of reasons that we think purely temporal parts are prior to purely tempo-
ral wholes.3⁷
This means abandoning temporal parts-first perdurantism in favour of
spatiotemporal parts-first perdurantism. Earlier, I claimed that wholes-
first perdurantism risks collapsing into a form of endurantism, but does
spatiotemporal parts-first perdurantismhave the sameproblem?Onemig-
ht argue that spatiotemporal parts, unlike temporal parts, can be endorsed
by endurantists. Any substantivalist who believes that spacetime is a sub-
stance and believes that spacetime can be divided into parts presumably
accepts ‘spatiotemporal parts’ too. This may be true, but what matters is
not whether spatiotemporal parts or temporal parts are permitted in one’s
ontology but what they do. For the transdurantist, spacetime may have
spatiotemporal parts, but ordinary objects are extended simples. Like-
wise, themulti-location endurantistmight believe in spatiotemporal parts
but still believes that ordinary objects are simples with multiple exact lo-
cations. In contrast, the spatiotemporal-parts first perdurantist believes
36 My reply is similar to Eagle’s (2011) response on behalf of the endurantist.
37 In addition to the reasons that we might take parts to be prior to wholes in general.
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that ordinary objects have one unique location: the extended spacetime
region filled up by its spatiotemporal parts.
Furthermore, spatiotemporal parts ought to be understood as unifying
the classical notions of spatial and temporal parts in much the same way
that Minkowski spacetime is best understood as unifying the spatial di-
mensions and the time dimension. Temporal parts and spatial parts are
still part of the picture, they just aren’t the kind of things that can be fun-
damental.
This view also vindicates the common perdurantist claim that exten-
sion through space and extension through time are much alike. It’s a nat-
ural fit with the standard perdurantist package which comes along with a
B-theory of time and eternalism. Spatiotemporal parts-first perdurantism
allows us to keep themore general advantages of parts-first perdurantism
here without falling prey to the flaws of wholes-first perdurantism.
3.7 conclusion
I have outlined parts-first, no-priority, and wholes-first forms of perdu-
rantism. Parts-first perdurantism seems to be the canonical form of per-
durantism and seems to fit with our intuitions about part-whole relations.
Parts-first and wholes-first perdurantism are not seriously threatened by
concerns about the intimacy and innocence of mereology or strict com-
position as identity. As such, I see little reason to endorse no-priority per-
durantism. Wholes-first perdurantism may sound the most strange out
of the three, but there are a number of different ways to make it a palat-
able view. Furthermore, those convinced by some of the arguments for
priority monism ought to be wholes-first perdurantists. The relevance of
priority, according to Buonomo and Heller, is in how it can be used to re-
spond to phenomenological arguments. However, as I have argued, there
are good reasons to believe that phenomenological arguments favour no
particular view here. Instead, priority matters because of the arguments I
present from Minkowski spacetime, which put pressure on perdurantists
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How (Quantum) Things Persist
4.1 introduction
In this paper, I explore the issue of how quantum objects persist through
time. In particular, I evaluate some recent arguments made by Thomas
Pashby regarding the implications that quantum theory has formetaphys-
ical debates regarding persistence (Pashby, 2013; 2016). Before doing this,
I will provide a brief overview of the persistence debate more generally.
Broadly speaking, the debate over how objects persist centres around
two views. The first is endurantism, which is the view that objects are
wholly present at each moment of their existence. In contrast, perduran-
tists believe that objects persist by having temporal parts at different times
of their careers. The doctrine of temporal parts suggests that objects are,
in some sense, only partly present at any one temporal instant. This de-
bate hinges on whether objects have temporal parts.
However, the metaphysics of persistence has recently undergone what
Damiano Costa calls the locative turn. (Costa, 2017: 57) In addition to the
disagreement over mereology, the persistence debate also encompasses a
debate concerning locations. Locative endurantists hold that objects have
many exact locations at many spacetime regions. If we take these objects
to be multiply ‘wholly located’ at every moment at which they exist then
this is an endurantist view. So, this is a view which can capture the en-
durantist notion of being ‘wholly present’ and explain persistence without
invoking temporal parts. Locative endurantism provides the resources
to say that objects are wholly present at each region they exactly occupy.
While the locative endurantist thinks that objects are exactly locatedmany
times over, so-called locative perdurantists contend that objects only have
one exact location: their path.Thepath of an object is the fusion of all of its
exact locations. In other words, the path of an object is the region where
its entire career is exactly located. An object is exactly located at some re-
gion iff it has the exact same shape and size as that region and stands in
all the same spatiotemporal relations to entities as that region (Gilmore,
2008: §2).
One can have a mereologically endurantist but locatively perdurantist
metaphysics. In this view, persisting objects are singly located at their re-
spective paths but they do not have temporal parts. This view is known
as transdurantism. Mereological forms of endurantism do not seem to
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entail their locative siblings and the same goes for perdurantism.1 Mereo-
logical theories of persistence were developed to deal with the problem of
change, whereas locative theories concern debates about the metaphysics
of location.
In ‘Do Quantum Objects Have Temporal Parts?’, Pashby develops a no-
tion of quantum temporal parts which he argues is incompatible with
quantum theory (Pashby, 2013). In ‘How Do Things Persist? Location
Relations in Physics and the Metaphysics of Persistence’, he argues that
some other formulations of perdurantism in quantummechanics also fail
(Pashby, 2016). What Pashby offers are some novel arguments which at-
tempt to apply quantum theory to the metaphysics of persistence.
Why should metaphysicians take arguments from quantum theory se-
riously? Well, quantum mechanics is a purportedly fundamental theory
of matter. Along with general relativity, quantum mechanical theory is
one of the twomajor pillars ofmodern physics.Many philosophers rightly
have serious issues with contravening contemporary physics. Presumably,
we all want to keep ourmetaphysics consistent with things that we take to
be true. As such, we should reject accounts of persistence that are at odds
with fundamental physics.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In §4.2, I begin by introducing
Pashby’s main assumptions and the Hilbert space formalism that he uses.
Then, I outline Pashby’s first argument against perdurantism in §4.3. I will
turn in §4.4 to Pashby’s second argument against perdurantism, which
demonstrates a problem with Wightman localisation that puts pressure
on Pashby to adopt an event ontology of quantum ‘objects’ and a theory
of persistence that he calls reiterationism. In §4.4, I investigate Pashby’s
reiterationism and argue that it is actually a form of perdurantism with
additional assumptions. Finally, I argue that we have good reasons to re-
ject some of Pashby’s more controversial assumptions and that perduran-
tists can develop a quantum mechanics-friendly theory by doing so. Ulti-
mately, I contend that perdurantists have no need to radically revise their
metaphysics in light of Pashby’s arguments.
4.2 pashby ’ s formalism
The specific formalismand interpretation of quantum theory thatwe ought
to adopt remains up for debate. It is necessary to take sides when evalu-
ating arguments that apply results from a particular formalism to meta-
1 One could also have a mereologically perdurantist but locatively endurantist meta-
physics. Persisting objects turn out to be multi-located things with temporal parts for
each of its instantaneous exact locations. Hudson (2001) endorses a view somewhat sim-
ilar to this, where objects are located at many different overlapping four-dimensional
regions.
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physics.This is because different interpretations of quantum theory entail
different views about fundamental ontology.
Pashby notes that his arguments rely on two key assumptions (Pashby,
2013). The first is realism, which is simply the claim that quantum states
provide an accurate description of the physical systems.This also includes
the forward implication of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link. Briefly put, this
is the claim that iff a physical system is in an eigenstate of an observable
then we can assign it an eigenvalue and that when physicists measure an
eigenvalue of an observable’s operator then that system is in an eigenstate.
If a physical system is not in an eigenstate, then it we cannot assign it an
eigenvalue. In other words, a system in some state |ψ〉 has a eigenvalue
oi iff |ψ〉 is an eigenstate of Ô.2 The second is completeness, which is the
claim that a pure state gives us a complete description of an individual
quantum system.3 Nothing is left out and there are no hidden variables,
like those postulated by Bohmian interpretations of quantum mechanics.
Hence, the assumption of completeness rules out Bohmian mechanics.⁴
We could choose to take completeness for granted. One might note
that it would be unreasonable to expect philosophers of science to defend
their interpretation of quantummechanics every time theymake an argu-
ment. That Pashby’s metaphysical conclusions are derived from a specific
interpretation of quantum mechanics precludes a strong result.⁵ Pashby
defends the assumption of completeness on the basis that it, combined
with the rest of his formalism, has a solid claim to be the ‘canonical form
of quantum mechanics’. Assuming completeness puts pressure on Pashby
to adopt an interpretation of quantum mechanics that secures it, such as
a Copenhagen interpretation or the Everettian interpretation.
Pashby goes on to suggest that his assumptions justify the claim that
quantum states describe real physical objects. Pashby argues that meta-
physicians who are realists about ordinary objects ought to treat quantum
states as describing persisting objects. He points to the fact that even large
molecules like buckminsterfullerene (C₆₀), also known as ’buckyballs’, ex-
hibit quantum behaviour. As such, he suggests that those who believe that
tables (composed of collections of complex molecules) are persisting ob-
jects ought to believe that buckminsterfullerene molecules are too. He
then goes on to claim that states describe persisting physical objects.
Pashby’s arguments deal with systems that have no internal degrees of
freedom like spinless particles. The state space H of quantum theory is
2 We can take the eigenvalue oi to be an associated definite value O.
3 This assumption is a kind of synchronic completeness, since a truly complete description
should also tell us about quantum dynamics.
4 Also known as the De Brogile-Bohm theory.
5 This is hardly a serious issue given that the different responses to themeasurement prob-
lem tend to entail different metaphysical conclusions.
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provided by the space of quadratically-integrable functions which are de-
fined over the entirety of space.⁶ Or rather, the space of quadratically-
integrable functions defined over infinite-dimensional complex Hilbert
spaceH = L2(R3).⁷ By ‘complex’, Imean that infinite-dimensionalHilbert
space is taken over the complex numbers. Pure states |ψ〉 are in a one-to-
one correspondence with the one-dimensional subspaces of H, or more
specifically, the set of independent unit vectors that individually span
those one-dimensional subspaces.The superposition principle tells us that
linear combinations of pure states can also be given as pure states, since
H is a vector space.
To see how quantum states could describe persisting objects, we need
to look at the Schrödinger and Heisenberg pictures of quantum mechan-
ics. In the Schrödinger picture, the operators are constant and the state
vectors evolve over time. The opposite is the case in the Heisenberg pic-
ture: the state vectors are time-independent while the operators that act
on them vary over time.
In the Schrödinger picture, the persisting quantum object is described
by a family of states |ψ(t)〉, which are parameterised by t ∈ R. After the
state of a system at a time is given, the whole family of states is determined
in accordance with the time-dependent Schrödinger equation: |ψ(t)〉 =
Ut|ψ(0)〉.The pure state |ψ(0)〉 describes an object that exists at time t = 0.
We can then interpret the family of states |ψ(t)〉 as describing a persisting
object that exists at each time t. In the Heisenberg picture, the state of the
system is |ψ〉 at all times, whereas the operators evolve with time.
However,mustwe take the Schrödinger picture states |ψ(t)〉 to describe
a persisting object? Presumably, things can go out of existence in the quan-
tum system and that will be captured in the time evolution of the system
too. Hence, it might be more appropriate for us to consider |ψ(t)〉 as de-
scribing a persisting process or a system of transient things. This view
has received support in both the foundations of physics literature and in
Mauro Dorato’s work on the ontology of quantum mechanics.⁸ We don’t
denote quantum systems using the natural language predicate ‘is an ob-
ject’ and it’s not clear that all quantum systems are objects in a metaphys-
ical sense either, although some might be. Some have even argued that
quantum systems cannot be individuals (da Costa and Lombardi, 2014).
I will put this worry aside for now and return to it later.
The Schrödinger and Heisenberg pictures are equivalent in the sense
that they give the same expectation values for any operator. Pashby ar-
6 For the sake of simplicity, I’m only considering a single spatial dimension.
7 To account for an additional internal degree of freedom with two possible values, the
state space for particles with spin is He = L2(R3)⊗C2 = L2(R3C2).
8 See (Dieks, 2002; Haag, 2013; Rovelli, 2005) for physicists and (Dorato, 2015) for a
philosopher.
4.3 quantum mereology 69
gues, however, that the two pictures might not be metaphysically equiv-
alent. This brings us to Pashby’s evaluation of mereological theories of
persistence.
4.3 quantum mereology
In Pashby’s view, the family of states |ψ(t)〉 can suitably describe a num-
ber of short-lived, instantaneous objects, while |ψ〉 can more easily be
conceived of as a temporally extended individual. According to him, the
Schrödinger picture states |ψ(t)〉 fit best with endurantism and the stage
theory. His endurantist interpretation of the Schrödinger interpretation
suggests that the states |ψ(t)〉 are distinct states of a single, persisting in-
dividual. Admittedly, it is hard to see how intuitively this fits with en-
durantism. If |ψ〉 describes a single individual that exists at many times,
then we have some prima facie reason to hold that the Heisenberg pic-
ture is actually a better fit for endurantism. Presumably, Pashby thinks
that the Schrödinger pictureworkswell for endurantists because enduran-
tists want a picturewhere things havemany three-dimensional locations.⁹
In his account, the Schrödinger picture is one where an object is wholly
as it is at each time, and it changes as its state evolves. Note, however,
that this change is precisely what motivates perdurantist solutions to the
problem of change in the first place. In contrast, Pashby thinks that the
Heisenberg picture works well for perdurantists and transdurantists be-
cause those theories entail that objects have a single four-dimensional
location. A time-independent state vector which ‘looks different’ at dif-
ferent times once the operators that act on them evolve seems to fit with
this.
Pashby notes that the Schrödinger picture states |ψ(t)〉 seem to fit well
with the stage theory, which is a heterodox form of perdurantism that
takes temporal parts themselves to be continuants and not spacetimewor-
ms.1⁰ We could take it that these states correspond to a series of distinct,
instantaneous quantumobjects related by the non-periodic unitary group
Ut. We could then take temporal parts of a persisting quantum object to
be sets of these states. The set of states {|ψ(t)〉 : t ∈ [t1, t2]} describes a se-
ries of instantaneous stages which collectively extend from t₁ to t₂. Oddly,
Pashby seems to implicitly rule this view out for worm-theoretic perdu-
rantists. As previously noted, he claims that worm theorists and transdu-
rantists must describe objects using the Heisenberg picture state |ψ〉. This
is odd because worm theorists and stage theorists share the same funda-
9 Even so, it’s not at all clear that the Schrödinger picture can supply us with three-
dimensional locations. We could end up without any well-defined positions at all over
the evolution of the system.
10 The stage theory is also called ‘exdurantism’ (Haslanger, 2003).
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mental ontology. The key distinction between the two views is that worm
theorists claim that the objects we discuss and quantify over are spacetime
worms while stage theorists claim that these objects are temporal stages.
However, most stage theorists also accept spacetime worms exist. Worm
theorists and stage theorists share an ontology, so the key difference be-
tween them is in their philosophical semantics.11 If stage theorists are
able to account for arbitrary instantaneous quantum objects, then there
is no reason to think that worm theorists cannot do the same. The ob-
jects of quantum theory are not typically members of any ordinary sortal
predicate to begin with, so linguistic disagreement about ordinary sortals
shouldn’t have any impact here. Even so, whether we treat the sortal ‘elec-
tron’ in a worm-theoretic or stage-theoretic way is unlikely to make any
difference serious enough to force us to adopt a particular picture of the
dynamics.
So I disagreewith Pashby that themathematically equivalent Schrödinger
and Heisenberg pictures of quantum mechanics are not metaphysically
equivalent. Both pictures can represent perdurantist and endurantistmeta-
physics.Themathematical equivalence of the two pictures opens the door
to metaphysical equivalence. If any particular theory of persistence were
ruled out in one picture, I would think that it would be ruled out in the
other.
For perdurantism, the Schrödinger picture seems to be a good option
for developing an account of temporal parts. Nevertheless, Pashby’s view
that worm theorists are forced to adopt the Heisenberg picture motivates
the rest of his argument. While he does not consider relativistic quan-
tum mechanics in his paper, he notes that it poses some problems for
the Schrödinger picture (Pashby, 2013: 1147). Assuming we have inde-
pendent reasons to adopt the Heisenberg picture, it is worth developing
a Heisenberg-friendly account of quantum temporal parts.
What does it mean to say that the Heisenberg picture state |ψ〉 has tem-
poral parts? Pashby suggests that we can discover a notion of what it is
for |ψ〉 to have temporal parts by revisiting Lewis’s original motivation
for perdurantism. That is, by drawing an analogy between temporal parts
and spatial parts. Just as ordinary objects extend through space by hav-
ing parts at different spatial locations, they also extend through time by
having temporal parts at different times. So, Pashby takes it that an appro-
priate idea of what it is for |ψ〉 to have temporal parts ought to be similar
to an appropriate account of how we might say it has spatial parts.
Pashby thinks that we need some way to describe |ψ〉 as a sum of quan-
tum objects with a suitable part-whole relation. Recall that Pashby is as-
11 Excluding nihilist stage theorists or pixelists, who do not believe that temporal parts fuse
into spacetime worms (Patrone, 2020).
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suming completeness here, so it makes sense that we need something in
the permanent state description to correspond to a description of the ac-
tual object’s spatial and temporal parts. The most direct way to do this
is to find a way to talk about the state as a sum of quantum objects.12
Part-whole relations in standard mereology are reflexive, transitive, and
antisymmetric. Pashby notes that the subspaces of a vector space labelled
A,B,C . . . are partially ordered by an inclusion relation. This relation is
reflexive because A ⊆ A. It is transitive because if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ C ,
then A ⊆ C . It is also anti-symmetric because if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A then
A = B.
Pashby suggests that we can develop a notion of quantum spatial parts
in reference to a localisation scheme. Essentially, we can give the spatial
parts of |ψ〉 in terms of the subspaces of H that are associated with the
eigendecomposition of the position observable Q of a particle. The posi-
tion observable Q plays a useful role in Pashby’s account because it links
every spatial region 4 with a projection operator P△ on H in such a
way that disjoint spatial regions are assigned to mutually orthogonal sub-
spaces.13 When we project a vector state |ψ〉 onto the subspace that is as-
sociated with4, we get the state P△|ψ〉 = |ψ△〉. Pashby notes that we can
take P△|ψ〉 = |ψ△〉 to describe a quantum object wholly located within
the region4which is a spatial part of |ψ〉. The spatial part |ψ△〉 is wholly
located within 4 because it is the eigenstate of P△, which is a projection
valued measure (PVM) that associates spatial regions with subspaces of
H.1⁴
One problem with Pashby’s scheme is that we need not interpret it as
something providing us with spatial parts. We could alternatively take
P△|ψ〉 = |ψ△〉 to be something that is true of |ψ〉 relative to 4. In other
words,P△|ψ〉 = |ψ△〉 describes |ψ〉 from the perspective of4. So it could
include properties |ψ〉 has at 4 by virtue of other locations. For example,
locative endurantists might want to say that someone currently sitting
down has the property was standing.1⁵
But one advantage of this way of assigning spatial parts is that they
covary with spatial translations. Spatial translation is when we apply a
translation operator which shifts particles in a specific direction by a spe-
12 Of course, there may be other ways of doing this. But if we’re assuming completeness,
then we need something in the state description to correspond to a description of the
object’s parts.
13 It’s important to note as well that subsystems only correspond to independent spatial
parts if they are associatedwithmutually orthogonal projections. Otherwise this scheme
would fail to respect the phenomenon of entanglement.
14 Obviously the localisation scheme itself doesn’t tell us anything about where systems are
localised in particular but merely that they localisable. In general, systems will not be in
an eigenstate of any projection P△.
15 They have that property while they are sitting.
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cific amount. These spatial parts covary with spatial translations because
U †aP△Ua = P△−a, where Ua = e−iPa is the single parameter group of
spatial translations in the direction of a which is generated by the mo-
mentum P . This is due to the fact that the position observable Q and P
are canonically conjugate, as [Q,P ] = i. We can view these translations
as passively moving the origin of the spatial coordinates by a. In the new
coordinates, P△−a|ψ〉 denotes the same spatial part that P△|ψ〉 = |ψ△〉
does in the old coordinates. If we view this actively, then the covariance
ensures that the partUa|ψ△〉 is simply the same part |ψ△〉moved to a new
position 4+ a.
However, in the Heisenberg picture, the projections P△(t) are indexed
to times. We end up with P△(t)|ψ△〉 = U †t P△Ut = |ψ△〉. Here, the sub-
spaces picked out by the Heisenberg picture projections are invariant un-
der temporal translations.
Put simply, all of this means that if we were to apply a translation oper-
ator to a system, measure its position, and then translate it back, then we
would get the same result as if we had just measured its position directly
in the first place.
One might object that Pashby is assuming we must define our mereol-
ogy in terms of quantum mechanics.1⁶ It might be beneficial to define
spatial parts directly in terms of spatial regions, but it is unclear that
we should begin our theory of parthood with quantum mechanics. Even
then, those who consider mereology an extension of first-order logic may
be inclined to suggest that we should not define parthood in terms of
quantum mechanics in the same way that we should not define the exis-
tential quantifier in terms of quantum mechanics. One might instead be
attracted to the idea that we take parthood as basic and then work out
which parts are spatial or temporal once we figure out where they are
located. Pashby (2016) points out that since localisation schemes in quan-
tummechanics make no references to spatial parts, wemight be better off
treating quantum systems as extended simples.1⁷ Pashby has essentially
gerrymandered a notion of spatial parthood out of a localisation scheme
that doesn’t entail parts. Nevertheless, I will continue.
By analogy to his notion of quantum spatial parthood, Pashby suggests
that a temporal part present during the interval I = [t1, t2] is a quantum
object PI |ψI〉 which is a part of |ψ〉. Presumably, the temporal parts of
|ψ〉would be objects |ψI〉which are eigenstates of a projection associated
with the interval I . This projection, PI , is a PVM. This way, the subspaces
associated with disjoint intervals aremutually orthogonal and |ψI〉 is only
present at I .
16 This is particularly problematic whenwe consider the prevalence of quantum holism: the
thesis that the properties of a quantum system do not supervene on those of its parts.
17 Extended simples are also called ‘spanners’ (McDaniel, 2007).
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Pashby’s main worry for this notion of temporal parts is that it must ad-
here to temporal translation invariance, just as his notion of spatial parts
adheres to spatial translation invariance.A temporal part |ψI〉, when shifted
in relative time by t via the application of a translation operator, should
be identical with the temporal part wholly present during I + t. Here PI
needs to covary with the time shift such that U †PIUt = PI−t. This is be-
cause, as Pashby notes, that our definition of temporal parts should not
rely on any particular coordinisation of the time axis. A temporal part
wholly present during I , when ‘shifted’ in relative time by t, ought to be
identical with the part wholly present during I + t. While spatial trans-
lations are generated by the self-adjoint momentum operator P (canon-
ically conjugate to H), temporal translations must be generated by the
self-adjoint time operator T (also canonically conjugate to H). On this
scheme, temporal parts exist in virtue of the properties of a general time
observable. A ‘no-go’ result called Pauli’s theorem precludes this.The text-
book interpretation of Pauli’s theorem among physicists is as follows:
[T]ime is just a parameter in quantummechanics, and not an operator.
In particular, time is not an observable […] It is nonsensical to talk about
the time operator in the same sense as we talk about the position operator
(Sakurai, 1994: 66).
Pauli’s theorem is typically taken to rule out the existence of time ob-
servables that are canonically conjugate to the Hamiltonian H. On this
interpretation, any time translation invariant notion of temporal parts is
doomed to fail. A self-adjoint time operator T canonically conjugate to
H is needed to generate the shifts in the spectrum ofH , which in turn is
the generator of Ut (understood as a strongly continuous, one-parameter
unitary group paramterised by energy).This doesn’t mean abandoningUt
and the Schrödinger equation, it simply means that Ut does not involve
such a one-parameter group parameterised by energy.
Pashby endorses amuchweaker interpretation of Pauli’s theorem (Pashby,
2014a: Ch.4). He believes that it merely restricts the form of any possible
time operators. The real upshot of Pauli’s theorem according to Pashby is
the spectral condition. The spectral condition requires the allowed values
of energy of a quantum system to have a lower bound. In other words, the
spectral condition precludes the existence of Hamiltonian operators with-
out a spectrum bounded frombelow. If we rejected the spectral condition,
then we would be allowing for systems that can indefinitely transfer en-
ergy to their surroundings. This would be deeply unphysical; no systems
that we know of do this. So, Pashby offers the following reductio of perdu-
rantism:
P1. PI is a PVM.
P2. U †PIUt = PI−t.
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P3. Ut is a unitary group produced by a self-adjoint operator H.
P4. H must have a lower bound. (Spectral Condition)
C1. For all I , PI = 0.
C2. Hence, for all I and all |ψ〉, PI |ψ〉 = 0 (where 0 is the zero vector).
(Pashby, 2013: 1145)
Pashby takes both P1, P2, and P3 to be necessary for the states PI |ψI〉
to be temporal parts of |ψ〉, this follows from his ideas about what per-
durantism is. However, quantum mechanics tells us that H must have a
lower bound. This gives us the result PI |ψ〉 = 0, meaning that no quan-
tum system |ψ〉 can have temporal parts.
Pashby suggests that we could relax P1 by using position operator val-
ued measures (POVMs) rather than PVMs. Recall that a temporal PVM
assigns a projection operator PI to the interval I . A temporal POVM
would be able to assignHermitian positive semidefinite operatorsEI grea-
ter than or equal to 0 to I . This gives us the quantum objectsEI |ψ〉. These
behave similarly to temporal parts without being assigned to orthogonal
subspaces. The objects EI |ψ〉 give us a means of assigning properties to
times. Temporal POVMs, unlike temporal PVMs, can obey time trans-
lation covariance. However, Pashby notes that we shouldn’t view the ob-
jects EI |ψ〉 as temporal parts. These assignments give us a covariant as-
signment of times to operators but they do not give us a temporal decom-
position of the state space into distinct subspaces analogous to Pashby’s
notion of quantum spatial parthood. On this view, times are not associ-
ated uniquely with subspaces of H. This is essentially a form of transdu-
rantism, where properties are indexed to times in a perdurantist-like way
without invoking temporal parts to do so.
4.4 t ime observables and localisation
In ‘How Do Things Persist? Location Relations in Physics and the Meta-
physics of Persistence’, Pashby admits that the perdurantist can avoid his
previous argument by refusing to adopt his definition of quantum tempo-
ral parts. One could simply take the path of a quantum system to be the
fusion of its many instantaneous spatial locations and then posit tempo-
ral parts for each of these instantaneous locations, for example.
Pashby concedes that this definition of temporal parts is not threat-
ened by the spectral condition. However, he argues that the notion of
quantum systems as temporally extended entities occupying a continuous
spatiotemporal path is untenable.This is a problem for perdurantists who
argue that objects must be temporally extended in this manner in order
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to persist through time. This is an even more serious problem for perdu-
rantists who reject instantaneous temporal parts in favour of extended
temporal parts.1⁸
Pashby argues that the spectral condition produces the following prob-
lem for locating quantum systems at temporally extended regions: First,
we can take P ({tk}) to be a projection operator denoting possession of
the property P at every t within some interval tk. Let the state |ψ〉 be in
the range of P ({tk}), such that P (t)|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 for all times within the
interval tk. Then either,
1. P ({tk}) = P (R), or:
2. {tk} is a set with a zero Lebesgue measure (Pashby, 2014b; 2016).1⁹
Hence, there is no projection P (I) describing some property instanti-
ated by an object at an open temporal interval and at no other time.2⁰
Pashby notes that we can interpret this result in two ways: either any
system confined to a spatial region for a temporal interval is confined to
that region for all time or a nonzero probability that the system is localised
outside of the region at any t entails that it is never actually localised inside
the region (Pashby, 2016).21 In otherwords, if we performed a localisation
experiment then the particles we detect could never be measured outside
of the lab at a different time. Admitting the very possibility that we could
detect them outside of the lab in the future entails that they cannot be
located inside the lab at more than a set of times with zero measure.22
If quantum systems are temporally extended objects with extended
temporal parts, then they face the same kind of ‘no-go’ result presented
in Pashby’s earlier argument against quantum temporal parts.23
Pashby also claims that this raises a serious problem for the view that
the quantum state provides a complete description of the properties of
a persisting physical object (Pashby, 2014a; b). The spatial properties of
these systems are very temporally sparse. We are left with a puzzling em-
pirical result suggesting that persisting objects fail to be localised in a spa-
tial region at most times or are stuck in one region at all times. Pashby
18 Jeremy Butterfield’s (2006) ‘anti-pointilliste’ perdurantism is a prominent example.
19 It’s important to note that this results from the same version of Pauli’s Theorem that
Pashby endorses. In both papers, Pashby uses a lemma fromHegerfeldt (1998) to present
a proof of Pauli’s Theorem (Pashby, 2013; 2016).
20 With this open interval being a subset of the real numbers R.
21 If we were considering an infinite potential well (a particle trapped in a box), then the
former interpretation would be correct. However, there are no known infinite potential
wells in reality.
22 This result also applies to subregions. Localisation within a subregion of a region is just
as restricted as localisation within the region itself.
23 But not all is lost for the perdurantist who endorses instantaneous temporal parts, since
they can simply posit temporal parts for each instant that a system is localised upon
measurement.
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claims that this result implies that quantum states do not describe persist-
ing objects. In what follows, I outline and respond to Pashby’s preferred
ontology of quantum systems and persistence.
4.5 pashby ’ s re iterationism
Pashby contends that we can, and indeed should, understand localisation
in terms of events. His event ontology forms the basis of his favoured the-
ory of persistence, which he calls reiterationism.
Instead of treating P△(t) as an experimental question about the posi-
tion of some physical system asked at some t, Pashby interprets it as a
proposition about the occurrence of an event in 4 at t. He notes that we
do not need to radically change how we view localisation experiments in
light of this:
Picture a typical diffraction experiment which involves a source emit-
ting a beam of particles, a diffraction grating through which the beam
passes, and a luminescent screen.The source of quanta (electrons or pho-
tons, say) emits a single quantum particle at a time, at a frequency such
that only a single particle is ever in the apparatus.
Some time after a particle is emitted, a dot appears on the screen, and,
repeating the experiment many times, the relative intensity of these dis-
crete events comes to forma characteristic spatial interference pattern[…]
the outcome of the experiment is an event […and] the time interval after
which the dot appears will vary; finally, the screen is sensitive over the
entire course of the experiment, and an individual experiment ends only
when the particle is detected (Pashby, 2014b: 8).
But what exactly are ‘events’? Pashby (2014b) outlines his view in ref-
erence to David Lewis’s (1986) account of events as properties or classes
of spatiotemporal regions.2⁴ The property is held by ‘exactly one region
of any world where the event occurs’ (Lewis, 1986: 243). By ‘exactly one’,
Lewis restricts the location of events to precisely one region and not any
subregion or superregion. As such, a localisation event cannot occur both
in4 and in its superregion.We can distinguish here between an event oc-
curring ‘at’ a region and an event occurring ‘within’ a region. Events oc-
curring ‘within’ a region4 also occur within every related subregion and
superregion, whereas events occurring ‘at’ 4 do not.
Thepossible outcomes of a localisation experiment correspond toworlds
in which a detection event occurs at t.2⁵ Probabilities are assigned once
24 Lewis uses the term ‘property’, but clarifies: ‘By a property I mean simply a class. To have
the property is to belong to the class’ (Lewis, 1986: 244).
25 Imake use of possible-worlds talk here, but Pashby (2014b) suggests that this is amenable
both to ersatz views and possibly Alastair Wilson’s quantum modal realism (Wilson,
2020). I’m not so sure about this, since Pashby’s view seems difficult to combine with
realist interpretations where the state only supplies part of the ontology (Wallace and
Timpson, 2010).
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an experiment begins and they concern if the event in question occurs at
some t, along with the chances of detection at t. Anything that could have
a probability of coming to pass is an event anyway, so it’s not complicated
to see how changing quantum states could supply probabilities for events
to occur.
Pashby’s event ontology puts pressure on him to take a controversial
stance on the infamous measurement problem. By endorsing the forward
implication of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link, Pashby was able to argue
that quantum systems cannot be temporally extended. But in some inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics, instantaneously localised states also
require an infinite potential well (Wallace, 2014). Pashby points out that
he can avoid this problem by endorsing both directions of the eigenstate-
eigenvalue link with the Copenhagen interpretation (Pashby, 2016: 302-
303).Thiswouldmean that quantum systems have somemeasurable qual-
ity F with value F when and only when the quantum state is in an eigen-
state of F with eigenvalue F . However, Copenhagen interpretations are
deeply unpopular among philosophers of physics. This would render Pas-
hby’s reiterationism deeply unattractive for philosophers who dislike the
implications of adopting a Copenhagen interpretation and wavefunction
antirealism.While Pashby’s arguments are already inapplicable to Bohmi-
anism, it’s hard to deny that the ‘standard’ view of states giving a complete
description of a persisting object is a far more natural fit for Everettian
views than Pashby’s event view.
Alternatively, Pashby could consider the ‘flash’ ontology version of the
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory of spontaneous collapse.Ghirardi-
Rimini-Weber theories suggest that the wave function does not always
obey the Schrödinger equation, but rather have a small probability of un-
dergoing spontaneous collapse at a fixed rate per particle per unit time
(Dorato, 2015). Spontatneous collapse is represented by Gaussian func-
tions which have a fixed width in physical space. In the flash ontology
version (GRWf), an ontology of ‘flashes’ at spacetime points is postulated
at the centre of the Gaussian function. These ‘flashes’ or ‘jumps’ of wave
functions in the configuration space correspond to localised events in re-
ality. The ontology of GRWf is ultimately composed of discrete events
scattered in spacetime.
One worry is that Lewis’s theory of events is too sparse and compatible
with standard object-level ontologies, including Lewis’s own, to feature as
the basis of Pashby’s reiterationism.Rather, Pashby’s view seems to require
events to be basic or perhaps identical to regions of spacetime. The latter
view is endorsed by Bertrand Russell (1927), Donald Davidson (1980),
and W.V.O. Quine (1985). This would completely avoid the difficulty that
Pashby (2016) identifies with taking (spatiotemporally located) events to
be ontologically prior to spacetime regions.
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Pashby formulates reiterationism in reference to the views of Russell
(1927) and Alfred North Whitehead (1925). One issue is that Russell and
Whitehead do not share a theory of persistence. They have substantive
metaphysical differences which leave Pashby’s (2016) reiterationism an
ambiguous view.
Whitehead’smetaphysicswas a forerunner of today’s perdurantism. Like
Pashby, Whitehead adopts an ontology of events or what he calls actual
occasions (Whitehead, 1929: 18). Whitehead conceives of these events as
parts of persisting processes, which he also calls enduring objects. (White-
head, 1929: 34) Of course, these events are not identical to each other, so
this is not a form of locative endurantism. However, I don’t think that
Pashby’s view is identical to Whitehead’s. This is because Whitehead’s
process ontology involves a number of extra metaphysical commitments,
such as process theology. it’s clear that Whitehead’s theory of persistence
is a form of perdurantism in all but name.2⁶
In contrast, Russell rejects the idea that anything persists through time
and change (Russell, 1927). Russell has no problem with the existence of
groups of events unified by some scientifically-relevant relation. He does,
however, have a problem with the idea that groups of events compose
a persisting material object. Russell contends that this notion is ‘empiri-
cally useless’ (Russell, 1927: 248). Furthermore, he claims that since any
series of events includes entities with different properties, so there can-
not be a single object that shares all of these different properties. The lat-
ter claim is easily dealt with by perdurantist accounts where the bearers
of contradictory properties are different temporal parts of the same four-
dimensional entity. Russell’s other claim that persistence is of no scien-
tific value is more interesting, but still highly controversial. One might
remark that persistence seems to play an important role in some areas
of scientific inquiry. For example, the notion of detecting ‘particle tracks’
in a bubble chamber seems to involve the assumption that a sequence of
bubbles is produced by the same particle over time (Goyal, 2019). Just as
Whitehead’s view was a forerunner of modern perdurantism, one might
also say that Russell’s ‘no-persistence’ view was a forerunner of a specific
kind of modern perdurantism: a version of the stage theory without fu-
sions.2⁷
Pashby’s (2016) view clearly cannot be the same as both Russell’s and
Whitehead’s, since Russell and Whitehead have very different views. If it
26 We could try to construct a non-perdurantist, Whitehead-like process ontology. We
could have a view where nothing fell in the range of the first-order quantifiers, but there
was still variation in states of affairs over time. This would be a view where truth didn’t
supervene on being, since there are changes in events without changes in things. This
wouldn’t be a perdurantist view, but it would certainly be a confusing one.
27 An example of this might be Fabio Patrone’s pixelism, which combines the stage theory
with mereological nihilism (Patrone, 2020).
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is a view like Whitehead’s, then we’re left with a form of perdurantism
with extra baggage. If it is a view like Russell’s, then we’re left with a ‘no-
persistence’ view that looks a lot like a nihilist version of the stage theory.
Either way, we’re back to working with things that could be principally
called ‘temporal parts’.
Pashby suggests that his view has an advantage in terms of parsimony
(Pashby, 2014a). We need event-time observables, but we can do away
with the notion of quantum systems as bizarre persisting objects. Pashby
has aminimalist view similar to ontic structural realismwhere objects are
eliminated from his ontology. The issue with this claim is that Pashby’s
view seems no different when we replace his talk of events with talk of in-
stantaneous temporal parts. If events are nothingmore than spacetime re-
gions, then Pashby’s events are no different from the ‘objects’ of supersub-
stantivalism, a view where objects are identical to their spacetime regions.
Perdurantists have good reasons to take supersubstantivalism seriously,
since they already believe that facts about the locations of objects super-
vene on the qualities of the locations themselves (Eagle, 2016). Pashby
claims that we need event ontology because the odd, temporally sparse en-
tities in his ontology are bizarre and don’t correspond to common sense
ideas about what objects are (Pashby, 2014b: 7). Maybe so, but I do not
think there was ever any reason to believe that the objects of quantum
mechanics would line up with our pretheoretical intuitions. They might
not be the objects we were looking for, but if they are the entities that we
have, then I see no reason to refrain from calling them ‘objects’. There is
no real advantage to positioning reiterationism as a minimalist alterna-
tive to object ontology, since we can endorse Pashby’s reiterationism and
get temporal parts along with quantum ‘objects’ for free.
4.6 quantum perdurantism reformulated
But what if we choose not to define quantum temporal parts or tempo-
ral location with reference to a time observable? If we do this, then any
project of defining quantum temporal parts parallel to Pashby’s notion of
quantum spatial parts is doomed from the start. But this does not mean
that perdurantism is doomed. There might not be any time observables
canonically conjugate to the Hamiltonian, but we still have time param-
eters in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. We could consider a time
parameter parallel to external spatial coordinate parameters – the things
which an event of a spatial localisation experiment is a localisation with
respect to. If we define temporal parts in terms of an external time param-
eter, then we do not need to define them by gerrymandering a merely
artefactual notion of quantum spatial parthood either. Unlike Pashby’s
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view, this view is not interpretation dependent. We do not need to adopt
or reject a Copenhagen interpretation here.
On this approach, perduring quantum systems are not temporally ex-
tended with respect to a time observable but are simply extended with re-
spect to time itself. Once we have this sort of picture, one might wonder
why we ever expected quantum objects to be temporally extended per-
sisting objects in the observable sense in the first place. Any view which
respects the spectral condition is guaranteed to rule this out. With my
view, we have no need to radically revise our metaphysics in the face of
this result.
How do we make sense of localisation experiments? When we ‘localise’
a particular system, it gets localised to a bounded region. Outside of times
where the system comes to be ‘localised’ as a result of instantaneous mea-
surement, the system’s temporal parts are imprecisely located at an un-
bounded region.2⁸ We are not relying on a time observable here, so we
do not run into an objection from Pauli’s Theorem. I agree with Pashby
(2016) that we cannot assign a known exact location to a system not in
an eigenstate of position. What we can do, however, is assign it a weak lo-
cation. Josh Parsons gives the following informal gloss of weak location:
I am weakly located in my office iff I am in my office in the weakest
possible sense: iff my office is not completely free of me. I should count
as weakly located in my office when I am sitting at my desk, when I am
reaching an arm out of the window, or when I am reaching an arm in the
window from the street outside (Parsons, 2007: 203).
We can follow Antony Eagle’s suggestion of taking a quantum object
not in an eigenstate of position to be ‘weakly located at all and only those
regions at which it has a non-zero chance of being found onmeasurement
of position’ (Eagle, 2019: 160). Their wave function is effectively spread
out across space. These quantum objects, or rather their temporal parts,
can still come to have an exact location on measurement. It makes sense
that quantum objects are located somewhere even if they are not in an
eigenstate of position. It would be very odd for these objects to be able to
have a well-defined momentum if they weren’t located anywhere.
It is technically the case that all quantum objects not in an eigenstate
of position weakly coincide. Is this a problem? Hardly. Eagle (2019: 160)
points out that we can still make claims about quantum objects to the
effect that the objects have zero probability of being localised at the same
region on measurement. This means that quantum systems can still be
temporally extended objects that are exactly located at their path.
28 I feel a bit apologetic for retaining phrases like ‘localised as a result of ’ to explain mea-
surement, since I don’t intend to take a stand on the measurement question like this sort
of language might imply.
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Pashby suggests that abandoning his definition of a quantum tempo-
ral part would mean abandoning a strict analogy between space and time
(Pashby, 2013: 1144). Note Ted Sider’s statement that ‘the heart of four-
dimensionalism is the claim that the part-whole relation behaves with re-
spect to time analogously to how it behaves with respect to space’ (Sider,
1997: 204).The commitment to this analogy is typically considered an ad-
vantage when defending a perdurantist ontology in a relativistic setting
(Balashov, 2010). In addition, most perdurantists are B-theorists (Haw-
ley, 2018: §6). They believe that change over time can be described in
tenseless terms; that change over time is much like spatial variation. A
banana ripening over time changes in much the same sort of way that a
road changes its height as you traverse up a hill. If this analogy is aban-
doned and time turns out to be completely unlike space, then perduran-
tism might some of its dialectical force.
I don’t think that abandoning Pashby’s notion of quantum temporal
parts actually has this consequence.2⁹ Defining quantum temporal parts
with respect to a time parameter actually retains the analogy between
space and time. Representing time by a parameter is not an issue, since
space is represented by a parameter in quantum mechanics too. Pashby’s
quantum spatial and temporal parts do not draw an analogy between
space and time, they actually draw an analogy between position and time.
Hilgevoord (2005) points out that this is a fairly common conceptual con-
fusion in quantum theory. He argues that one reason for this is that we
tend to use spatial coordinates like x, y, and z to denote the eigenvalues of
a particle’s position observable. If the position operator’s eigenvalues are
identical to spatial regions, then it’s no wonder that we might look for an
operator with eigenvalues identical to times. However, the eigenvalues of
position are only identical to spatial regions when considering a system
with a single particle. Once we considermore complex systems in 3N con-
figuration space, we should distinguish space and time coordinates from
dynamical variables (Hilgevoord, 2002).
Thus, this does not generalise.
29 However, suppose that Pashby is right and this forces us to treat time and space differ-
ently. Still, this might not be a serious problem for perdurantism. Perdurantism does
not require symmetry between space and time, despite Pashby’s claims to the contrary.
We don’t need a strict analogy to hold between spatial parts and temporal parts. It is
true that perdurantists often motivate their view by drawing an analogy between spatial
parts and temporal parts. We’re able to extend through space because we have spatial
parts and we’re able to extend through time because we have temporal parts. This has
some pedagogical utility, since it’s a good way to introduce the idea of temporal parts.
Furthermore, perdurantists who absolutely refuse to permit the existence of time observ-
ables could simply adopt a disjunctive view: space and time are analogous in a relativistic
setting but not in non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
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On my view, non-relativistic quantum mechanics is understood as a
theory of dynamic systems in a fixed spacetime.3⁰ Non-relativistic quan-
tum mechanics is not a theory of spacetime. This is in direct contrast to
theories like loop quantum gravity where there is no classical background
spacetime. On Pashby’s view, this understanding of non-relativistic quan-
tum mechanics is rejected. Instead, event-time observables are included
in an attempt to develop an event ontology of quantum mechanics.
4.7 conclusion
I have shown that Pashby’s arguments against perdurantism are ultimately
unsuccessful. Perdurantists have a number of viable avenues to escape his
reductio of the doctrine of temporal parts. Perhaps themost promising op-
tion is to concede that quantum systems are not temporally extendedwith
respect to any time observable in quantummechanics but arewith respect
to time as an external parameter. Pashby’s treatment of quantum systems
with respect to time as an observable puts pressure on him to adopt a
discrete event ontology. Even then, Pashby’s event ontology pushes him
towards a theory of persistence that resembles two different historical an-
tecedents of modern perdurantism and essentially a form of perduran-
tism in all but name. In conclusion, perdurantists do not face a ‘no go’
result from non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
30 This view is shared with Gordon Fleming (2014). It might also be shared by David Wal-






In this conclusion, I provide a summary of the arguments detailed in the
three essays. I also talk about some issues that I have not engaged with
and point at directions for future research.
5.1 summary of arguments
In the first essay in the body of this thesis, I responded to the objection
that the worm theory cannot account for our intuitions about ordinary
counting sentences. Many perdurantists have responded to this objection
by rejecting the worm theory in favour of the stage theory. However, I ar-
gued that the worm theory is still salvageable. In fact, I think that my
version of the worm theory does a better job than its stage-theoretic alter-
natives.
Furthermore, my version of the worm theory also presents a unified
account of object- and event-related counting sentences. Event-related
counting sentences turn out to be a species of object-related counting
sentences. My account of event-related counting sentences is similar to
Barker’s, butmy view does not invoke a disjunctive interpretation of quan-
tifiers or multiple kinds of ‘identity’ relations.
The main consequence of my argument in Counting for Worm Theo-
rists is that I eliminate the main motivation for adopting the stage the-
ory. Many philosophers have adopted the stage theory in response to the
counting problems faced by the worm theory. But it turns out that the
worm theory, once supplemented with situation semantics, actually pro-
vides the best perdurantist account of ordinary counting sentences. So
one might well suggest that we should never have abandoned the worm
theory in the first place.
The second essay fleshed out a distinction betweenparts-first, no-priority,
and wholes-first perdurantism. I explored ways that one might motivate
these different views and different ways they could be formulated. We
have good reasons to treat parts-first perdurantism as the orthodox per-
durantist view. It helps motivate mereological universalism, which is cen-
tral to the Lewisian perdurantist worldview. In contrast, wholes-first per-
durantism does not fit well with mereological universalism. Such a view
might be more attractive for those who endorse restricted composition.
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I suggested that these views point towards a conflict betweenmereolog-
ical perdurantism and so-called locative perdurantism. Those who take
the claim that objects are four-dimensional entities more seriously than
the claim that they persist in virtue of their temporal parts might find
themselves in favour of wholes-first perdurantism, whereas mereological
perdurantists should adopt a parts-first view.
In contrast to Buonomo and Heller, I argued that different views re-
garding priority should not be seen as reflecting different views about phe-
nomenology. While they have motivated the distinction between parts-
first, no-priority, and wholes-first views in this way, it turns out that the
distinctiondoes not play an illuminative rolewhendiscussing phenomenol-
ogy.
Instead, I argued that different ways of accounting for persistence in
Minkowski spacetime reflect different views about mereological priority.
The relativity of simultaneity presents an interesting scenario, since we
have ways of developing both wholes-first and parts-first accounts. I sug-
gested that we could modify Balashov’s relativistic argument for pedu-
rantism and against endurantism to be an argument for wholes-first per-
durantism. Although the argument fails, we are left with the choice be-
tween an account where many point-sized spatiotemporal parts are prior
to their four-dimensional fusions and an accountwhere four-dimensional
objects are prior to their parts.
Perdurantism andPriority ismostly a surveyal paper.My contributions
to the literature are more minor than they are in Counting for Worm
Theorists. I explored the distinction between parts-first, no-priority, and
wholes-first perdurantism in detail while arguing against the claim that
phenomenological arguments favour any particular view here.
In How (Quantum) Things Persist, I showed how some recent argu-
ments from non-relativistic quantum mechanics against perdurantism
fail. I pointed out that Pashby’s first argument against perdurantism runs
into some problems. For example, notion of quantum spatial parts and
quantum temporal parts is not an appealing one. Some of his claims about
the significance of the worm theory/stage theory distinction for quantum
dynamics are also suspect. Both of his arguments rely on the assumption
that we must define quantum temporal parts and temporal location with
reference to a time observable.
This assumptionmotivates Pashby’s adoption of an event ontology, whi-
ch he calls reiterationism. I argued that Pashby’s reiterationism pressures
him to take a controversial stand on the measurement problem and re-
quires amore robust notion of ‘event’ thanhe provides. I note that Pashby’s
view, if we are to make much sense of it at all, is simply a bizarre form of
perdurantism.
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I rejected Pashby’s assumption that we should define quantum tempo-
ral parts with reference to a time observable. Instead, I pointed out how
we could define quantum temporal parts in terms of an external time pa-
rameter. This makes more sense than expecting quantum objects to be
temporally extended in the observable sense. I also argued that does not
force us to abandon the popular perdurantist analogy between space and
time, since space is also a parameter in quantum mechanics. The upshot
of this essay is that perdurantists do not face a ‘no go’ result from non-
relativistic quantum mechanics.
5.2 directions for future research
It would be silly of me to claim that I have addressed all issues in themeta-
physics of persistence here. Several worthwhile questions remain to be
answered, either in greater detail or at all. For instance, in my first paper,
I assumed that counting is by identity. There are, however, those who dis-
agree with this assumption. David Liebesman (2015) argues that we are
unable to account for sentences that express counts given by non-natural
numbers, such as fractions, if we count by identity. Oliver R. Marshall
(2017) responds by treating sentences indicating fractions as measure-
ment sentences instead of counting sentences. He thinks that we ought
to interpret utterances of ‘there are two and a half oranges on the table’
as measuring quantities of orange-stuff. Eric Snyder and Jefferson Barlew
(2019) develop a view where ‘there are two and a half oranges on the ta-
ble’ is ambiguous between counting interpretations, where we count two
oranges and one half orange, and measuring interpretations. It might be
an interesting project to try to defend the claim that these are counting
sentences and that we don’t need to adopt an measuring interpretation
of them. There are objections to this view, namely that it struggles to ac-
count with cases like following an utterance of ‘there are two and a half
bagles are on the kitchen table’ up with ‘twice as many onions as that are
on the dining room table’ (Liebesman, 2015: 27). ‘That’ seems to desig-
nate a number value of 2.5. Can we interpret ‘that’ differently? I’m not
entirely sure and so I think that the question warrants further investiga-
tion.
Many of the ideas in Perdurantism and Priority could be developed fur-
ther independently. Whether perdurantists committed to any additional
ontological theses is one example. Notions of priority and groundingwere
briefly introduced but have a vast literature of their own. There is consid-
erable debate about what exactly grounding is and what entities it can
apply to. I also think that I could explore the idea of no-priority mereol-
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ogy in greater detail. Similarly, I think some of the versions of wholes-first
perdurantism that I briefly outlined could be developed further.
My third paper,How (Quantum)Things Persist, discussednon-relativistic
quantum mechanics but not theories which attempt to combine the em-
pirical successes of quantum mechanics and general relativity. It would
be interesting to see how we might think about persistence in the context
of quantum field theory or theories of quantum gravity like string theory
and loop quantum gravity. In a relativistic setting, we do not have a fixed
classical spacetime to fall back on. Point-sized particles are replaced with
one-dimensional strings in string theory, which may present unique chal-
lenges for both perdurantists and endurantists. In addition, both string
theory and loop quantumgravity present problems for the idea that space-
time is fundamental.Most formulations of loop quantumgravity areman-
ifestly background-independent; there is no fixed spacetime background
as found in classic mechanics and special relativity. While I do not think
that non-relativistic quantummechanics decisively settles the issue of per-
sistence, it is possible that some other theory might. More generally, I
think it would be a useful project to see how we might make sense of per-
sistence in these theories.
I did not explore the issue of location in great detail. It comes up at var-
ious junctures, but I did not provide a systematic account of locative re-
lations. There remains considerable debate over location in metaphysics.
For example, philosophers disagree over which locative relations, if any,
should be taken as primitive (Gilmore, 2008). The central disagreement
between so-called locative endurantists and perdurantists concerns whet-
her an object’s exact location is unique and whether objects must be tem-
porally extended. If multiple location is impossible, then multi-location
endurantism must be ruled out. Similarly, we must rule out locative per-
durantism if temporal extension turns out to be impossible. It might also
turn out that our existing locative relations fail in the face of fundamental
physical theories. These are all issues worth exploring in further detail.
There are, of course, many other issues that I have not explored in this
thesis. I briefly discussed some of these in the Introduction. While many
of these issues have been discussed by other philosophers in great detail,
many questions remain unsettled. I assumed a B-theory of time through-
out this thesis, but what exactly is our best theory of the metaphysics of
time? If it turns out to be a B-theoretic view, then what exactly should it
look like? We could try to salvage the apparent ‘dynamic’ nature of time
by appealing to our temporal phenomenology or we could advocate for
eliminating time from our ontology altogether.
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